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  Trade-based market manipulation, which is usually described as trading shares to initiate a price 
change or to cause an artificial price, has received wide attention in policy and academic discussions, al-
though the behavior is still poorly defined in both legal and economic literature. This Article contributes 
to an understanding of manipulation by providing a precise definition. A differentiation is made between 
supported and unsupported price pressure. Supported price pressure contributes to price efficiency, while 
unsupported price pressure creates societal costs. Trade-based market manipulation, thus, should be de-
fined as exercising unsupported price pressure. The analysis sheds light on the long-standing debate 
about the possibility of formulating an objective definition of manipulation, refuting the assertion that a 
mens rea element is necessary. Existing prohibitions should be interpreted in line with the ‘unsupported 
price pressure’-standard, that is allow supported price pressure but bar unsupported price pressure. 
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  2 I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
A.  The subject, reason and objective of the Article 
  Trade-based market manipulation [hereinafter manipulation] is thought of as trading shares 
specifically to cause a price change. The behavior may best be explained by an example. Con-
sider a trader willing to sell 1 million shares ABC to an institutional investor in a contractual per-
son-to-person deal. In the morning, the two parties enter into a contractual agreement, stating that 
the closing price of shares ABC on the exchange will be taken as the transaction price. In the af-
ternoon, the trader buys 10,000 shares ABC on the exchange, for no other reason than to inflate 
the price from $10 to $11, thus fixing the closing price higher in his favor. Obviously, the trader 
benefits at the expense of the institutional investor. 
  Many nations have regulations against manipulation: Section 10(b) Securities and Exchange 
Act (SEA) 1934, Rule 10b-5, and Section 9(a)(2) SEA 1934 prohibit manipulation in the United 
States, Section 1(2)(a) Market Abuse Directive (MAD) 2003/6/EC in the European Union, and 
Section 1041A Corporations Act (CA) 2001 in Australia.
1 The problem is that these regulations, 
which will be discussed in Section I.A.1., are overly broad. The irony is that they, in conjunction 
with common enforcement actions,
2 may ban welfare-enhancing trades. 
                                                        
 
1    The repression of trade-based market manipulation goes back more than a century. 
One of the first cases in the United Kingdom occurred in 1892: Scott v. Brown, Doering, McNab 
& Co., 1892-2 Q.B. 724, 730 61 L.J. (N.S.) 738, 741 (C.A.). The first case in the United States 
arose in 1933: United States v. Brown, 5 F. Supp. 81, 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1933). See LOUIS LOSS & 
JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 3986.10-20 (VIII Revised 2004). See also Hubert De 
Vauplane & Odile Simart, The Concept of Securities Manipulation and Its Foundations in 
France and the USA, 23 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 203, 206-210 (1997). 
2    There is a continuous stream of enforcement actions. See, e.g., Rajesh K. Aggarwal & 
Guojon Wu, Stock Market Manipulations, 79 J. BUS. 1915 (2006), at 1935 and 1938. Their sam-
  3  Unsurprisingly,  this  status quo has instigated an academic debate about the just definition of 
manipulation.
3 Fischel and Ross delivered an analysis of existing definitions and suggested an 
improved definition.
4 They concluded that ‘there is no objective definition of manipulation’,
5 and 
so, ‘[t]he only definition that makes any sense is subjective – it focuses entirely on the intent of 
the trader.’
6 Yet, their argument for shifting from an objective definition to a subjective one, 
which will be examined in Section I.A.2., has both a practical and doctrinal flaw. 
  This Article aims to tackle these problems by proposing an improved definition of manipula-
tion, which is not only useful to design future policy but also to interpret existing prohibitions. 
Further, since defining behavior is the start of a natural research sequence, other points of contro-
versy can be more readily discussed, such as the tracing of manipulation
7, the incidence of ma-
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
ple includes 142 manipulation cases brought by the SEC between 1990 and 2001. About half the 
cases included some form of trade-based market manipulation. Further, European and Australian 
authorities were recently involved in two high profile cases. The German regulator investigated 
Citigroup in 2005. See Päivi Munter, Criminal investigation sought in Citigroup bond case, FI-
NANCIAL TIMES, January 24, 2005. And the Australian regulator came to a settlement with a di-
rector of HIH Insurance Ltd. See David Elias, Adler guilty on 4 charges, THE AGE, February 17, 
2005. 
3    See, e.g., Guido A. Ferrarini, The European Market Abuse Directive, 41 CMLREV. 
711 (2004); Omri Yadlin, Is Stock Manipulation Bad? Questioning the Conventional Wisdom 
with the Evidence from the Israeli Experience, 2 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 839, 842 (2001); VIVIEN 
GOLDWASSER, STOCK MARKET MANIPULATION AND SHORT SELLING 99-138 (1999); Daniel R. 
Fischel & David J. Ross, Should the Law Prohibit "Manipulation" in Financial Markets?, 105 
HARV. L. REV. 503, 507-510 (1991); Gary L. Gastineau & Robert A. Jarrow, Large-Trader Im-
pact and Market Regulation, 47 FINANC. ANAL. J. 40, 41 (1991). 
4   See Fischel & Ross, supra note 3, at 510 (‘Manipulative trades could be defined as 
profitable trades made with “bad” intent -- in other words, trades that meet the following condi-
tions: (1) the trading is intended to move prices in a certain direction; (2) the trader has no belief 
that the prices would move in this direction but for the trade; and (3) the resulting profit comes 
solely from the trader’s ability to move prices and not from his possession of valuable informa-
tion.’). 
5    Id., at 519. 
6    Id. 
7    See, e.g., Marcello Minenna, The Detection of Market Abuse on Financial Markets: A 
  4 nipulation
8 and the justification for regulation
9. The improved definition does not resolve the en-
forcement complexities, nor does it examine the incidence of manipulation. 
 
1.  Current prohibitions and their shortcomings 
  In the United States Section 10(b) SEA 1934
10 and Rule 10b-5
11 have become the most impor-
tant prohibitions to counteract manipulation. The language of the Statute is at least as important 
as the language of the Rule, since courts have interpreted the Statute more narrowly than the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Quantitative Approach, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=483962, at 32-33 (2005); LARRY 
HARRIS, TRADING AND EXCHANGES 273-274 (2003); Yadlin, supra note 3, at 849-850; IOSCO, 
INVESTIGATING AND PROSECUTING MARKET MANIPULATION 12-21 (2000); GOLDWASSER, supra 
note 3, at 113-119; Steve Thel, $850,000 in Six Minutes -- The Mechanics of Securities Manipu-
lation, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 219, at 291-294 (1994); Fischel & Ross, supra note 3, at 519-521; 
Gastineau & Jarrow, supra note 3, at 44-45; J.I. GOLDSTEIN AND T.A. LEVINE, SECOND ANNUAL 
MARKET MANIPULATION 120-134 (1990). 
  8    See, e.g., Asim Ijaz Khwaja & Atif Mian, Unchecked Intermediaries: Price Manipu-
lation in an Emerging Stock Market, 78 J. FINAN. ECON. 203 (2005); Guolin Jiang, Paul G. Ma-
honey & Jianping Mei, Market Manipulation: A Comprehensive Study of Stock Pools, 77 J. FIN. 
ECON. 147 (2005); Aggarwal & Wu, supra note 2; Yadlin, supra note 3; Paul G. Mahoney, The 
Stock Pools and the Securities Exchange Act, 51 J. FINAN. ECON 343 (1999). 
9    See, e.g., Thel, supra note 4, at 287-297; Fischel & Ross, supra note 3, at 553; Gasti-
neau & Jarrow, supra note 3, at 45. 
10     Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act provides: It shall be unlawful for any person, 
directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the 
mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange - (…) (b) To use or employ, in con-
nection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or 
any security not so registered, (…) any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in con-
travention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appro-
priate in the public interest or for the protection of investors. 15 USC § 78j(b). 
11     Rule 10b-5 provides: It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by 
the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or any facility of 
any national securities exchange, (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) To 
make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order 
to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not 
misleading, or (c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would 
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any secu-
rity. 17 CFR § 240.10b-5. 
  5 Rule.
12 According to the Statute, it is unlawful ‘to use or employ, in connection with the purchase 
or sale of any security (…) any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance’. Section 10(b) 
SEA 1934, like Rule 10b-5, is so broad that informed traders who execute large transactions, 
might be qualified as manipulators even though they discount new information into the stock 
price. It is common knowledge that informed traders are necessary to keep financial markets effi-
cient.
13 As a result, by erring on the side of caution, they may forego welfare-enhancing trades. 
Another statute against manipulation is Section 9(a)(2) SEA 1934,
14 which has become obso-
lete due to the high burden of proof and its inapplicability to the over-the-counter market.
15 This 
provision applies to ‘(…) a series of transactions in any security (…) raising or depressing the 
price of such security (…).’ Remarkably, it encompasses all transactions raising or depressing the 
price, thus including transactions that discount new information in the price and secure efficient 
prices. I recognize that the applicability of the provision is limited by a mens rea element: ‘for the 
purpose of inducing the purchase or sale of such security by others’. Nevertheless, it is inaccurate 
to compensate an overly broad actus reus with a mens rea element. This would still mean that 
                                                        
12   ALAN PALMITER, SECURITIES REGULATION 268-269 (2002).  
13   See, e.g., HARRIS, supra note 4, at 235-243. 
14   Section 9(a)(2) of the Exchange Act provides: It shall be unlawful for any person, di-
rectly or indirectly, by the use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate com-
merce, or of any facility of any national securities exchange, or for any member of a national se-
curities exchange - (…) (2) To effect, alone or with one or more other persons, a series of trans-
actions in any security registered on a national securities exchange or in connection with any se-
curity-based swap agreement (as defined in section 206B of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act) with 
respect to such security creating actual or apparent active trading in such security, or raising or 
depressing the price of such security, for the purpose of inducing the purchase or sale of such se-
curity by others. 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a). 
15   See ALAN R. BROMBERG AND LEWIS D. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD AND COM-
MODITIES FRAUD § 6:67, at 195-197 (2
nd ed. 2003).  
  6 traders are not allowed to trade and discount new information in the price, if it is for the purpose 
of inducing other traders to follow suit.
16 
  In the European Union, twenty-five Member States have implemented a new prohibition on 
manipulation in the last few years: Section 1(2)(a) MAD 2003/6/EC. In brief, this provision re-
quires that market participants refrain from trading when their transactions would secure the price 
at an abnormal level.
17 Although the law does not define ‘abnormal level’, the prohibition might 
cover the situation in which a trader increases the price from $10 to $11, provided that the price 
had previously been stable at $10 for a sufficient period of time. However, the European prohibi-
tion ignores the fact that this trader could have impounded new information in the price. There-
fore, it may criminalize welfare-enhancing trades and deter legitimate traders. 
  Further, the Australian prohibition in Section 1041A CA 2001 is limited to transactions that 
create an artificial price.
18 Admittedly, ‘artificial price’ is more precise than ‘abnormal price’, but 
the concept still leaves the potential for multiple interpretations. The financial markets regulator 
[hereinafter regulator] could use the prohibition on manipulation to counteract various transac-
                                                        
16     Public companies frequently buy large amounts of shares, inducing the market to 
purchase shares and to bring the stock price to the fundamental value. See, e.g., Jesse Fried, In-
sider Signaling and Insider Trading with Repurchase Tender Offers, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 421 
(2000), at 426-434. Due to the overly broad actus reus, Section 9(a)(2) SEA 1934 could in fact 
restrict public companies to use buy-back programmes for signaling purposes. 
17     Section 1(2)(a) MAD 2003 provides: Market manipulation shall mean transactions 
or orders to trade which give, or are likely to give, false or misleading signals as to the supply of, 
demand for or price of financial instruments, or which secure, by a person, or persons acting in 
collaboration, the price of one or several financial instruments at an abnormal or artificial level 
(…). 
18     Section 1041A CA 2001 provides: A person must not take part in, or carry out 
(…): (a) a transaction that has or is likely to have; or (b) 2 or more transactions that have or are 
likely to have; the effect of: (c) creating an artificial price for trading in financial products on a 
financial market operated in this jurisdiction; or (d) maintaining at a level that is artificial 
(whether or not it was previously artificial) a price for trading in financial products on a financial 
market operated in this jurisdiction. 
  7 tions, i.e., all transactions raising or depressing the price, uninformed transactions raising or de-
pressing the price, transactions having the purpose of raising or depressing the price, and/ or 
transactions moving the price away from the fundamental value. Evidently, the regulator has dis-
cretionary powers to apply the prohibition as long as the term ‘artificial price’ or the behavior 
that results in an ‘artificial price’ is not defined in a precise way. 
What can we conclude about all these prohibitions? It seems that neither Section 10(b), nor 
Rule 10b-5, nor Section 9(a)(2) SEA 1934 precisely delineates manipulation. Even though there 
is considerable case law on manipulation, there still exists significant ambiguity about defining 
manipulation.
19 Further, the European and Australian prohibitions may be over inclusive due to 
the vague delineation of manipulation. The European and Australian courts have not produced 
any case law that sets a precedent to protect informed traders. The problem, therefore, is that 
these prohibitions most likely cover legitimate welfare-enhancing trades. 
 
2.  An academic definition and its shortcomings 
  The definition of manipulation has been subject to much debate, and legal scholars have put 
forward several definitions attempting to cover manipulation’s various facets. Fischel and Ross 
wrote a provocative article in the early 1990s discussing the need for regulating manipulation, af-
ter which Thel levied a serious reply.
20 Fischel and Ross delivered an analysis of existing defini-
                                                        
19     See for an overview of the case law, e.g., A.A. SOMMER JR., FEDERAL SECURITIES 
EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 § 6.01 to § 6.06 (2004); BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 12, § 
6:56 to § 6:75; GOLDSTEIN & LEVINE, supra note 4, at 3-99. 
20     See Fischel & Ross, supra note 3; Thel, supra note 4. 
  8 tions and suggested an improved definition.
21 They concluded that ‘there is no objective defini-
tion of manipulation’,
22 and so, ‘[t]he only definition that makes any sense is subjective – it fo-
cuses entirely on the intent of the trader.’
23 Thel did not question the definition suggested by 
Fischel and Ross, but merely focused on the arguments to regulate manipulation.
24 Yet, the shift 
from an objective definition to a subjective one has both a practical and doctrinal flaw. 
  What is the practical flaw? In situations of manipulation, bad intents can have practical and 
beneficial effects. Envision an informed trader who intends to manipulate the price. This trader 
does not cause any damage, even though he has bad intentions. On the contrary, his trading is 
beneficial to the market as a whole, discounting new information in the price. Evidently, this type 
of trader should be excluded from the prohibition. This is only possible if we have a clear objec-
tive definition of manipulation. So it does not make sense to focus entirely on the intent of the 
trader. Moreover, traders with good intent sometimes execute detrimental transactions. An unin-
formed trader who has no intentions to manipulate the price may exercise large price pressure and 
cause extensive damage. One should be able to qualify this behavior as manipulation, e.g., in 
civil cases. According to the definition suggested by Fischel and Ross this behavior could be no 
manipulation, since there was no intent, notwithstanding the significant damages. 
                                                        
21   See Fischel & Ross, supra note 3, at 510 (‘Manipulative trades could be defined as 
profitable trades made with “bad” intent -- in other words, trades that meet the following condi-
tions: (1) the trading is intended to move prices in a certain direction; (2) the trader has no belief 
that the prices would move in this direction but for the trade; and (3) the resulting profit comes 
solely from the trader’s ability to move prices and not from his possession of valuable informa-
tion.’). 
22     Id., at 519. 
23     Id. 
24     Thel too derives the normative judgment from the intent of the trader. Thel, supra 
note 4, at 221 note 17 (‘When used in this Article, unless the context otherwise requires, the word 
“manipulation” means buying a security for the purpose (emphasis added) of increasing the re-
ported price or selling a security for the purpose of decreasing the reported price.’) 
  9   There is also a doctrinal flaw. When it comes down to defining prohibited behavior, legal 
scholars commonly agree that a prohibition should merely cover objective undesirable behavior. 
Indeed no one is punishable for their thoughts (cogitationis poenam nemo patitur). This means 
one can not automatically shift from an objective to a subjective prohibition. Fischel and Ross 
clearly endorse this viewpoint when they acknowledge that ‘the law typically requires an objec-
tively harmful act before sanctions are levied’ and that ‘[b]ad intent by itself is not sufficient’.
25 
Still, they prefer to derive the definition of manipulation from the subjective intentions of the 
trader. Their argument is as follows. Since prohibitions generally require clearly observable ob-
jective harm, while manipulation does not produce easy observable, objective harm, the defini-
tion of manipulation should be subjective by nature. The reasoning of Fischel and Ross, however, 
does not withstand careful scrutiny. 
If Fischel and Ross believe that prohibitions in general should merely cover behavior resulting 
in clearly observable objective harm and that manipulation usually does not produce any, they 
should not have designed any new practical definition of manipulation. Remarkably, they sug-
gested an improved definition of manipulation with a focus on the intent of the trader. In addi-
tion, since Fischel and Ross consider observability of the objective harm to be essential, one 
would expect that this suggested definition would emphasize the observability in some way. They 
conclude, however, that the prohibition should preferably not rest on the unobservable objective 
harm, but instead on the unobservable intent of the trader. This is an exchange of one unobserv-
able element with another one. Clearly, they have not succeeded in designing a prohibition on 
manipulation that incorporates the observability of the behavior. 
                                                        
25     See Fischel & Ross, supra note 3, at 519. 
  10   Further, their assumption that prohibitions should only cover behavior producing clearly ob-
servable objective harm is relative. I agree that most prohibitions cover behavior that results in 
observable objective harm. Indeed, by prohibiting only this kind of behavior, authorities would 
face fewer enforcement complexities, limiting the probability of Type I errors. At the same time, 
prohibitions covering unobservable harm could contribute to shaping and changing norms and 
preferences,
26 which may offset the costs of false convictions. Besides, authorities enforce many 
other complex prohibitions on a regular base, such as the prohibitions on tax evasion and insider 
trading,
27 or establish proof of the unobservable mens rea, such as ‘knowledge’ or ‘willful’. The 
proof of manipulation and its objective harm could for a large part depend on circumstantial evi-
dence, just like the proof of tax evasion, insider trading, or the mens rea does so.
28
 
B.  The structure of the Article 
  A few questionable prohibitions and definitions of manipulation have been presented. Given 
the shortcomings, the main purpose of this Article is to construct an alternative objective defini-
tion of manipulation, which takes into consideration the societal costs of trading. The blueprint of 
a definition rests upon the behavior and the consequences of manipulation. The first element, the 
actus reus, is straightforward. A manipulator, like any other trader, executes one or more transac-
                                                        
26     See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill and Chaim Fershtman, Law and Preferences, 20 J. LAW., 
ECON., ORGAN. 331 (2004), at 331-332; Ted Sampsell-Jones, Culture and Contempt: The Limita-
tions of Expressive Criminal Law, 27 SEATTLE UNIV. L. REV. 133 (2003), at 133-134; Robert 
Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585 (1998), at 586; Kenneth G. Dau-
Schmidt,  An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a Preference-Shaping Policy, 1990 
DUKE L.J. 1, at 2-3. 
27     See, e.g., Linda S. Eads, From Capone to Boesky: Tax Evasion, Insider Trading, 
and Problems of Proof, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 1421 (1991), at 1421, note 1. 
28     Id., at 1449 and 1466. 
  11 tions. Therefore, the consequences of the transactions are the distinguishing factor, in particular 
the societal costs. As will be shown, the core of manipulation can best be described as exercising 
unsupported price pressure, since this creates societal costs.
29
  The remainder of the Article proceeds as follows. Section II is descriptive. The first step is the 
introduction of a new concept called ‘price pressure’, extending the commonly used concept of 
‘price change’. Subsequently, I examine how one can exercise price pressure and how price pres-
sure explains price changes, showing that prohibitions could advantageously bypass the term 
‘price changes’. Section III develops an alternative standard for evaluating different forms of 
price pressure. Here the concern is normative. I differentiate between supported and unsupported 
price pressure. A prohibition could then be based on the ‘unsupported price pressure’-standard, 
that is, to allow supported price pressure but bar unsupported price pressure. 
  The Article has some policy implications that will be considered in Section IV. The prohibi-
tions on manipulation in effect are not always compatible with the ‘unsupported price pressure’-
standard and may be tailored to the requirements of the standard. Further, the prohibitions may be 
limited with a materiality standard, thereby taking into account the enforcement costs with regard 
to immaterial unsupported price pressure. Subsequently, the analysis sheds light on the long-
standing debate about the possibility to design an objective definition of manipulation and the 
specific role of the mens rea element. Section V, finally, examines the application and extension 
of the ‘unsupported price pressure’-standard. 
                                                        
29     I merely consider how transactions create societal costs and ignore the potential 
costs of enforcing such a prohibition on manipulation. Nevertheless, one of the outcomes of the 
analysis is the introduction of a materiality standard, regulating the application of the prohibition 
and incorporating the costs of enforcement. At the extreme end, the materiality standard could in 
fact obstruct the use of the prohibition.  
  12  
II.  THE DESCRIPTIVE SIDE OF PRICE PRESSURE 
 
A.  How to define price pressure? 
  Manipulation has both a descriptive and a normative side. This Section analyses manipulation 
from a descriptive perspective. I will explain what price pressure is, how it relates to price 
changes, and how the extent of the price pressure can be determined. According to economic the-
ory, transactions have at least two effects. Transactions sometimes directly influence prices, infer-
ring that they may cause prices to change or stabilize.
30 Also, transactions always spread market 
information, which traders use for their investment decisions.
31 Market information sometimes 
indirectly influences prices. Section II is limited to the role transactions have regarding direct 
price influence. Section V.B.1. extends the analysis to transactions spreading market information 
and indirect price influence. 
 
                                                        
30     See, e.g., Robert W. Holthausen & Robert W. Leftwich, The Effect of Large Block 
Transactions on Security Prices. A Cross-Sectional Analysis, J. FINAN. ECON. 237 (1987); Myron 
S. Scholes, The Market for Securities: Substitution versus Price Pressure and the Effects of In-
formation on Share Prices, 45 J. BUS. 179 (1972); Alan Kraus & Hans R. Stoll, Price Impacts of 
Block Trading on the New York Stock Exchange, 27 J. FINANCE 569 (1972). Still, most transac-
tions (95,9%) do not result in a price change or result in a small price change of 1/8. See Thel, 
supra note 4, at 224. 
31     Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, On the impossibility of Informationally 
Efficient Markets, 70 AMER. ECON. REV. 393 (1980), at 393 (arguing that ‘the price system makes 
publicly available the information obtained by informed individuals to the uninformed’). Ronald 
J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 
(1984) (explaining how derivatively informed traders extract information from other traders). 
  13 1.  The definition of price pressure 
  A preliminary issue is how the execution of transactions can result in a price change. As to 
that, the efficient market hypothesis gives a ready-to-use description.
32 Corporations first disclose 
new information, traders then execute transactions, and the price finally adapts to the new infor-
mation. Since disclosed information drives transactions, information will be discounted in the 
price. New information, however, is not a necessary condition for price changes. Financial mar-
kets are, to a large extent, efficient, but not completely.
33 As a result, they leave room for traders 
who use large transactions to dry up or wash over liquidity, forcing the price up or down for 
some limited time. In such situations, no information is discounted in the price. While it stands to 
reason that most traders have insufficient capital to cause price changes, large traders in liquid 
markets and small traders in illiquid markets will sometimes be able to inflate or deflate the price. 
  To study manipulation, one should look at the individual contributions to the total price 
change, not at the collective effort to change prices. This is an underexposed aspect in previous 
articles and cases on manipulation. Quite often, the manipulator is simply held accountable for 
the total price change, even though such reasoning is not always justifiable. Envision a market 
with one manipulator and two ‘normal’ traders. Each person buys stock in corporation ABC 
within a short interval, while the price of shares ABC rises from $10 to $15 synchronously. The 
manipulator might be completely responsible for this price change. Just as well, his contribution 
might be negligible. So the challenge is to determine if and to what extent the manipulator and 
                                                        
32     See, e.g., Burton G. Malkiel, The Efficient Market Hypothesis and Its Critics, 17 J. 
ECON. PERSPECT. 59 (2003); Robert J. Shiller, From Efficient Markets Theory to Behavioral Fi-
nance, 17 J. ECON. PERSPECT. 83 (2003); ANDREI SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT MARKETS. AN INTRO-
DUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL FINANCE 2000. 
33     Id. 
  14 his subset of transactions has contributed to the price rise and to what extent the other traders are 
responsible. 
In order to enable this appraisal, we can better move away from the conventional definitions of 
manipulation, which normally concentrate on the execution of transactions and price changes. 
This Article takes a different approach and focuses on the vital link between transactions and 
prices, the ‘price pressure’. A trader will first execute transactions, then exercise price pressure 
and lastly influence the price. Price pressure is defined as the contribution to the total price 
change. I prefer the term ‘price pressure’ instead of ‘contribution to the total price change’, mak-
ing a clear distinction between the various forces that add up to the price change and the actual 
price change itself. Price pressure is the independent or explanatory variable, while the price 
change is the dependent variable. According to this approach, the accumulation of all individual 
price pressure equals the price change.  
 
2.  Price pressure and the price  
Most traders exercise no or negligible price pressure. The category of traders exercising rele-
vant price pressure is small. To illustrate the idea of price pressure, consider the following model 
of a market with three traders (X, Y and Z). Each trader exercises relevant price pressure (X’, Y’ 
and Z’) within a certain interval. The regulator suspects X of manipulation by exercising X’ and 
investigates how the three traders and their price pressure explain the price change, so that he will 
have a reliable estimate of the extent of X’. The regulator first determines the pre-manipulation 
price at t. He then estimates the values X’, Y’ and Z’ between t and t+i in order to explain the 
stock price at t+i. The pre-manipulation price at t and the post-manipulation price at t+i can be 
any positive number. The values X’, Y’ and Z’ are positive for upward price pressure, negative for 
  15 downward price pressure and zero for no price pressure. The relationship between the three types 
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In order to assess whether X is indeed a manipulator, the regulator should first determine X’ by 
using the step-by-step plan as will be described in Section II.B. and then make a normative judg-
ment about X’ on the basis of a standard still to be developed in Section III. There are two ways 
to estimate X’. The first option is to assess X’ directly by deriving X’ from the price change (Sec-
tion II.B.). A second option is to estimate X’ by subtracting all other forms of price pressure from 
the price change. Assume that X’, Y’ and Z’ are in fact +$5, -$3 and +$1 respectively, while the 
total price change is +$3. The regulator will probably assess X’ directly. Nevertheless, he could 
also calculate X’ by subtracting Y’ and Z’ from the price change: (+$3) - (-$3) - (+$1) or +$5. The 
direct way is preferable as it is less convoluted and entails fewer arithmetic steps. Nevertheless, 
the indirect way might serve as an additional check, especially when Y’ and Z’ are easy to dis-
cover. 
  The suspect will often contribute in some way to the price change. Sometimes, he is not com-
pletely responsible for the price change. The suspected trader might have: (1) reinforced, (2) sta-
bilized, or (3) created a price change. The trader reinforces a price change when he brings about a 
price change that is larger than without X’, stabilizes a price change when the price change is 
weaker than without X’, and creates a price change when he is fully responsible for the complete 
price change. For that reason, when a regulator suspects X of manipulating the price—because, 
  16 for example, the regulator observes no price change or a  large price change when he expects oth-
erwise—he cannot decide the direction and/ or the extent of X’ just by looking at the stock price 
behavior.
34 If a regulator would focus on the stock price behavior instead of the price pressure, 
disregarding the subtle difference, chances are that he will under- or overestimate the extent of 
X’. 
 
B.  How to determine price pressure? 
  The preceding analysis suggests that the regulator should determine the extent of the suspect’s 
price pressure. The regulator had best use the following sequence. The first step is to approximate 
the extent by linking the suspect’s trading volume to the total price change. And the second step 
is to polish the approximation by discounting the characteristics of the suspect’s transactions. 
 
                                                        
34     Consider the following two situations. In the first situation a regulator believes that 
a manipulator has operated and he observes no price change were he expects otherwise. What is 
the size of X’? X’ could have been either downward or upward and either small or large. X’ could 
have been -$0.1 that is when the combination of Y’ and Z’ turns out to be +$0.1. But  X’ could 
equally well have been -$5, provided that the other forces add up to +$5. In the second situation a 
regulator believes that a manipulator has operated and he observes a price change of +$5 were he 
expects otherwise. What is the size of X’? X’ could have been either downward or upward and ei-
ther small or large. X’ could have been +$0.1, that is when the combination of Y’ and Z’ turns out 
to be +$4.9. However, X’ could equally well have been +$5, provided that Y’ and Z’ add up to $0. 
  17 1.  Approximating the suspect’s price pressure 
  There is a simple formula to approximate the suspect’s price pressure: (‘the suspect’s trading 
volume’ / ‘the total trading volume’) * (‘Stock pricet+1’ – ‘Stock pricet’). Consider the following 
two examples on how to apply the formula.
35
  In the first situation, the suspect has bought 10,000 shares ABC within the defined interval and 
the rest of the market has bought 5,000 shares ABC. So, both the suspect and the rest of the mar-
ket exercised upward price pressure. Suppose that the stock price has increased from $10 to $12 
within the defined interval. We are now able to estimate the suspect’s price pressure, which by 
and large is 10,000 / (10,000 + 5,000) * ($12 - $10) or +$1.33. At the same time, the other market 
participants have exercised a price pressure as large as 5,000 / (10,000 + 5,000) * ($12 - $10) or 
+$0.66. The price pressure of the suspect and the price pressure of the rest of the market add up 
to the price change of +$2. 
  In the second situation, the suspect has bought 10,000 shares ABC within the defined interval 
and the rest of the market has sold 5,000 shares ABC. In this situation, the price pressure of the 
suspect and the rest of the market is in the opposite direction. The suspect exercised upward price 
pressure and the rest of the market exercised downward price pressure. Again, the stock price has 
increased from $10 to $12. The suspect’s price pressure is 10,000 / (10,000 - 5,000) * ($12 - $10) 
or +$4. The other market participants have exercised a price pressure of -5,000 / (10,000 – 5,000) 
                                                        
35     In case the price pressure of the suspect and the price pressure of the rest of the 
market are identical and contrary, so that the price completely stabilizes, the methodology 
changes. Imagine that the suspect’s and the market’s price pressure are +$5 and -$5 respectively. 
It is impossible to calculate the suspect’s price pressure (+$5/0). Alternatively, the regulator 
should estimate what the price change would have been without the stabilizing transactions. 
Since this situation is exceptional, I will not deal with it. 
  18 * ($12 -$10) or -$2. So, the suspect’s price pressure and the other price pressure add up to the 
price change of +$2. 
 
2.  Polishing the approximation 
  Now that the regulator has an approximation of the suspect’s price pressure, he should polish 
the estimate. The articles of Fischel & Ross and Thel make clear how a manipulator is able to 
build up price pressure.
36 Transactions of significant volumes move the downward sloping de-
mand curve,
37 act on the liquidity of the market,
38 and/ or act on the bid-ask spread,
39 thereby 
                                                        
36     See Thel, supra note 4, at 227-247; Fischel & Ross, supra note 3, at 513-519. 
These authors have discussed how traders could use various mechanisms to cause price changes, 
like moving the downward sloping demand curve, acting on the liquidity of the market, and act-
ing on the bid-ask spread. Traders will use the same mechanisms in order to cause price pressure. 
The bid-ask bounce could be denoted as price pressure or price change, depending on the interval 
and the other forces in the market. For convenience sake, I will treat it as price pressure. The first 
two mechanisms result in an adjustment of the bid- and ask-price (external price pressure), while 
acting on the bid-ask spread causes price pressure between the bid- and ask-price (internal price 
pressure). However, all three mechanisms are useful for building up real pressure. 
37     When the demand curve is downward sloping, a demand or supply shift would re-
sult in upward or downward pressure. In theory, each participant can exercise pressure through 
this mechanism. There is empirical evidence for a downward sloping demand curve. Howbeit, 
this particular mechanism will probably not be very effective for manipulation because the de-
cline is fairly small. See, e.g., Avner Kalay, Orly Sade & Avi Wohl, Measuring Stock Illiquidity. 
An Investigation of the Demand and Supply Schedules at the TASE, J. FINAN. ECON. 461 (2004); 
Jeffrey Wurgler & Ekaterina V. Zhuravskaya, Does Arbitrage Flatten Demand Curves for 
Stocks?, J. BUS. 583 (2002); Aditya Kaul, Vikas Mehrotra & Randall Morck, Demand Curves for 
Stocks Do Slope Down: New Evidence from an Index Weights Adjustment, J.  FINANCE 893 
(2000). 
38     In case a market buy order is nearly as large as or larger than the accumulation of 
the pending sell orders (to be sold at the current market price), the market buy order dries the 
supply at the current market price and causes upward pressure. The mirror image is a market sell 
order nearly as large as or larger than the accumulation of the pending buy orders (to be bought at 
the current market price). The market sell order floods the demand at the current market price and 
causes downward pressure. Each market participant could use this mechanism to exercise pres-
sure. The success depends on two variables: (1) the size, volume and speed of the orders and (2) 
the liquidity of the market. 
  19 building up price pressure. As a general rule, the larger the number, the size and/or the density of 
the transactions, the larger the price pressure. The regulator could use this insight to polish the 
approximation: if the suspect’s transactions were relatively more aggressive, that is they were 
relatively more successful in moving the downward sloping demand curve, in acting on the li-
quidity of the market, and/ or in acting on the bid-ask spread than the transactions of the rest of 
the market, the approximation of the suspect’s price pressure is on the low side and might be in-
creased. 
 
III.  THE NORMATIVE SIDE OF PRICE PRESSURE 
 
A.  The ‘unsupported price pressure’-standard 
  Section II has dealt with the relationship between transactions, price pressure and price 
changes. Trading behavior still needs a normative delineation. The following analysis concen-
trates on the normative side of price pressure, showing that manipulation can be defined as ‘exer-
cising unsupported price pressure’.  
 
1.  Unsupported price pressure 
  Government decision makers frequently fail to provide a clear and immediate cause to regu-
late manipulation. According to one often used reason, they would have to control the deliberate 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
39     A trader is able to cause an uptick or a downtick and change the market price. Let 
us assume that the bid price is $10 and the sell price is $11. If the market price is $10 and the fol-
lowing trade is a purchase, the market price will bounce to $11 (uptick). In case the market price 
is $11 and the next trade is a sale, the market price will bounce back to $10 (downtick). The pres-
sure between the bid and asks price is limited to the size of the bid-ask spread ($1). 
  20 interference with the free play of supply and demand in the security markets.
40 Another reason 
for counteracting manipulation is the prevention of a loss of confidence in market operations.
41 It 
could also be that manipulators are active and other market participants lose confidence. Both 
claims, however, lack serious empirical proof. Apart from that, even when government decision 
makers have compelling reasons to prohibit manipulation, they often design broad and general 
prohibitions, lacking a clear normative distinction between legal and illegal behavior. Some defi-
nitions rest primarily on poorly defined effects of trading in order to delimit illegal behavior.
42 
Other definitions use intent to mark off the supposed harmful behavior.
43 This way, the regulator 
exercises large discretionary powers to regulate the market, which may deter market participants 
from executing trades that would otherwise enhance welfare. These prohibitions are not com-
                                                        
40   H.R. REP. NO. 1383, 73
rd Cong., 2
nd Sess., 10-11 (1934) (‘The idea of a free and 
open market is built on the theory that competing judgments of buyers and sellers as to the fair 
price of the security brings about a situation where the market price reflects as nearly as possible 
a just price’); Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Insider 
Dealing and Market Manipulation (Market Abuse), COM (2001) 281 def., 3 (‘Fair prices result 
from individual analysis by investors of all public information. Prices resulting from manipula-
tion are set at another level, creating economic advantage solely for the manipulators, by damag-
ing the interests of all other investors.’). 
41     H.R. REP. NO. 1383, 73
rd Cong., 2
nd Sess., 10-11 (1934) (‘To insure to the multi-
tude of investors the maintenance of fair and honest markets manipulative practices of all kinds 
on national exchanges are banned.’); Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
Insider Dealing and Market Manipulation (Market Abuse), COM (2001) 281 def., 2 (‘Market 
abuse not only increases the cost for companies to finance themselves but also harms the integrity 
of financial markets and public confidence in securities and derivatives trading.’). 
42     See, e.g., Section 10(b) SEA 19934, Rule 10b-5, Section 1(2)(a) DMA 2003 and 
Section 1041A CA 2001. See for the full text of the provisions, note 7, 8, 15 and 16. The US pro-
visions apply to ‘any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance’ and ‘any act (…) which 
operates (…) as a fraud or deceit upon any person. The European definition covers trades creat-
ing an artificial or abnormal price, while the Australian definition is limited to trades resulting in 
an artificial price. 
43     See, e.g., Section 9(a)(2) SEA 1934. This Section applies to trading, whether or 
not resulting in a price change, if it is for the purpose of inducing the purchase or sale of such se-
curity by others. See further the definition proposed by Fischel and Ross, requiring bad intent. 
See for the full text note 11 and 18. 
  21 pletely inadequate, but there is an opportunity to narrow the prohibitions, communicating clearly 
to the market what kind of behavior is illegal. 
  The Article continues by positing that a few forms of trading result in societal costs. These 
trades qualify as manipulative. Trades not resulting in societal costs are exempted. When might 
trading bring about societal costs? One of the differences between a manipulator and a ‘normal’ 
trader is the quality of the price pressure. Just as information differs in quality, price pressure can 
be of high or low quality.
44 I will use the term ‘unsupported price pressure’ for low-quality price 
pressure. A trader exercises unsupported price pressure when he lacks sufficient information to 
justify the price pressure. Logically, I will use the term ‘supported price pressure’ for high-
quality price pressure. Traders exercise supported price pressure when they have sufficient in-
formation to justify their price pressure. Unsupported price pressure might create societal costs, 
because the price impact is partially or completely unfounded. Conversely, it is reasonable to as-
sume that supported price pressure does not result in societal costs, because this trading contrib-
utes to the efficiency of prices. Therefore, manipulation presupposes unsupported price pressure, 
which is a necessary condition.  
  If a regulator investigates a suspect, he needs at least compelling evidence that the suspect 
possessed insufficient information. The support of the price pressure should be derived from two 
variables: (1) the extent of the price pressure (see Section II.B.) and (2) the extent of the justifi-
able price pressure (see Section III.A.2.). If the trader’s price pressure is larger than the justifiable 
price pressure, he produces unsupported price pressure. The trader’s price pressure minus the jus-
                                                        
44   Akerlof’s seminal paper on the market for lemons shows that the production of low-
quality information might result in societal costs. In the same way low-quality price pressure can 
be costly and be a reason for regulation. George A. Akerlof, The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality 
Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970). 
  22 tified price pressure equals the extent of the unsupported price pressure. Otherwise, if the trader’s 
price pressure is equal to or less than the justifiable price pressure, he produces supported price 
pressure.  
  Imagine a trader who executes transactions and causes price pressure as large as +$5. He exer-
cises: (1) unsupported price pressure when his underlying information justifies, e.g., a price pres-
sure of $0; (2) partly supported price pressure (+$3) and partly unsupported price pressure (+$2) 
when his underlying information justifies a price pressure of +$3; or (3) supported price pressure 
when his information justifies a price pressure of +$5 or +$8. A trader, who exercises price pres-
sure as large as the justified price pressure, loses his complete information privilege, while a 
trader, who exercises price pressure smaller than the justified price pressure, protects at least a 
part of his information. The foregoing is depicted in the following three equations: 
 
(1) trader’s price pressure >  justifiable price pressure Æ unsupported price pressure 
(2) trader’s price pressure =  justifiable price pressure Æ supported price pressure 
(3) trader’s price pressure <  justifiable price pressure Æ supported price pressure 
 
  The proposed approach to distinguish between manipulators and ‘normal’ traders relates to the 
empirical approach to make this distinction. The empirical analysis of manipulation by measuring 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) is based on the following reasoning. If supposed manipu-
lators have inflated the price and the price remains high over time, the traders were most likely 
informed and not manipulative. Conversely, if the price drops, the traders were most likely ma-
nipulators. The proposed standard concentrates on the manipulator exercising unsupported price 
  23 pressure, while the ‘CAR’-standard centers on arbitrageurs removing a created mispricing. Obvi-
ously, the legal definition of manipulation should be based on the proposed standard and not on 
the ‘CAR’-standard, simply because the legal definition ought to focus on the suspect’s behavior, 
while the empirical approach covers the arbitrageur’s behavior. The following example illustrates 
the difference between the ‘unsupported price pressure’-standard and the ‘CAR’-standard. 
  Envision an informed trader who has information that points at future price pressure of +$3 
and exercises direct supported price pressure of +$3 at t. Fifty traders observe this behavior and 
follow suit. Each trader exercises indirect unsupported price pressure of +$0.04 at t+1. In this 
situation arbitrageurs do not reverse the +$3 contribution of the informed trader. On the other 
hand, they will remove the +$2 contribution of the other traders. Even though the informed trader 
exercised supported price pressure, the analysis shows some CAR due to removal of the overre-
action. Under the proposed standard, the informed trader is no manipulator. Conversely, accord-
ing to the ‘CAR’-standard, the informed trader may qualify as a manipulator. It is important to 
note that a trader who exercises supported price pressure is not responsible for causing indirect 
unsupported price pressure. Furthermore, the individuals are not blamed, as each exercised ir-
relevant unsupported price pressure (Section IV.B.). 
 
2.  Factual assessment 
  The procedure to determine whether a suspect has exercised unsupported price pressure in-
cludes the following steps. The regulator approximates the suspect’s price pressure based on the 
trading volumes and polishes the estimate by taking into account the characteristics of the sus-
pected transactions. The regulator then evaluates the suspect’s information position at the mo-
ment of trading. Having translated this information position into the justifiable price pressure, he 
  24 can decide whether the suspect has exercised unsupported price pressure or not. In principle, the 
discovery of the information position requires hard evidence. Also, the conversion of the infor-
mation position to the justified price pressure asks for an adequate and consistent argumentation. 
However, how can a regulator apply the ‘unsupported price pressure’-standard in practice? The 
next paragraphs define the concepts of ‘information’ and ‘non-information’. They further de-
scribe the method to discover the suspect’s information position and the way to translate the in-
formation position into the extent of the justified price pressure. 
  The application of the ‘unsupported price pressure’-standard depends for a large part on the 
delineation of the concept ‘information’. Henceforth, ‘information’ is all information that points 
at: (1) an undervaluation or overvaluation of certain shares; or (2) a change of the fundamental 
value of certain shares. If shares ABC are trading at $18, and the trader has information that their 
fundamental value is $20, the shares are undervalued and the trader is allowed to exercise price 
pressure between $0 and +$2. On the other hand, a trader could have information that points at a 
change of the fundamental value of certain shares. For example, a trader is the first to know that 
company ABC will lose its successful CEO, probably decreasing the fundamental value of the 
shares with -$1. In this situation, the trader is allowed to exercise price pressure between $0 and -
$1.
45 It is important to note that the trader can legitimately move the price away from the funda-
mental value as long as he exercises supported price pressure. The trader could legitimately sell 
shares and move the price from $18 to $17, even when the fundamental value of the shares is 
$20, because he discounts new information in the stock price. 
                                                        
45   This trader could of course violate the prohibition on insider trading. Nevertheless, a 
trader discounting inside information into the stock price contributes to efficiency and cannot be 
qualified as a manipulator.  
  25   Another important aspect of the ‘unsupported price pressure’-standard is the distinction be-
tween information and non-information. Consider the following three situations. Firstly, traders 
sometimes believe they have information that is not yet discounted in the stock price, while in 
fact it has been discounted in the stock price. Secondly, traders sometimes receive information, 
which is discounted in the stock price shortly after. In both situations, the trader has no informa-
tion and is not allowed to exercise price pressure. Thirdly, two traders could receive identical in-
formation at t, after which they both exercise price pressure at t+1. If the traders receive informa-
tion pointing at future supported price pressure of +$2, their combined price pressure should be 
+$2 or less. The more the information ages, the smaller the justified price pressure. So, traders 
should keep in mind that their information by any chance ages and becomes non-information, in-
fluencing the extent of justified price pressure. 
  How does the regulator then discover the information position? In theory, the regulator should 
determine what kind of information circulated within the complete market, in all states of the 
world, and what information has reached the suspect. Obviously, the regulator is hardly able to 
assess the suspect’s information position at the moment of trading.
46 Certainly, he is faced with a 
formidable task. Hence, he will have to gather a lot of soft evidence about the probability of an 
insufficient information position, most likely deriving an estimate of the supposed information 
position from the characteristics of the trades and the interests of the trader, an approach which 
includes a high risk of Type I errors. There are situations in which a regulator is not able to de-
                                                        
46   I agree with Yadlin, supra note 3, at 849 (‘Thus, very rarely will a fact-finder be able 
to determine whether or not a particular scheme was based on information.’). Indeed, we know 
from the enforcement of insider trading laws that the suspect’s information position is hard to 
prove. The regulator should determine what kind of information circulated within the company 
and what information might have reached the insider. He could, for example, use minutes from 
corporate meetings, reconstructing the information position of the insider. 
  26 termine the suspect’s information position, while he is able to conclude that the suspect’s infor-
mation position was most likely insufficient to justify the exercised price pressure. For example, 
this occurs where a market participant causes a an exceptional price increase of at least 10% or 
where a market participant shows extraordinary behavior that goes with a significant expected 
profit (Section V.A.2.). 
  In case the regulator is able to derive the suspect’s information position, the next step is the 
conversion of the suspect’s information position into the justified price pressure. A regulator has 
to provide a well-argued estimate of justified price pressure, in the absence of a definite algo-
rithm to calculate this value. A weak information position justifies small price pressure, just as a 
strong information position justifies a large price pressure. If an uninformed trader merely wants 
to gamble, having no relevant information, the extent of the justified price pressure is $0. If, how-
ever, an insider knows that the price is going to rise, the justified price pressure is relatively large. 
People may find the analysis of the information position and the conversion of the information 
position problematic. As already stated, the regulator is often not able to determine the precise 
extent of the unsupported price pressure, while he has opportunities to legitimately conclude that 
a trader most likely has exercised unsupported price pressure (Section V.A.2.). 
 
3.  Some improvements 
  This Article is based on the dichotomy of supported and unsupported price pressure. The dif-
ference lies in the quality of the price pressure. Most other papers distinguish between informed 
traders and uninformed traders who cause a price change. One should not confuse both ap-
proaches. Firstly, the proposed standard clearly isolates price pressure from noticeable price 
change. In this way, the focus is on the contribution of the suspect and not on the outcome of the 
  27 market. Secondly, the standard is applicable to assess both uninformed traders, who exercise 
price pressure, and informed traders, who exercise more price pressure than the justified price 
pressure. Finally, the standard allows us to determine the extent of the unsupported price pres-
sure, since it distinguishes between exercised and justified price pressure. Consequently, it is pos-
sible to introduce a materiality standard (Section IV.B.). Let us now examine the differences be-




48 pointed out that manipulation relates to the trader’s information 
position. Accordingly, a trader, who produces a price change while he has no information, might 
be a manipulator. Even though this approach has its merit, it is not explicit. The authors ignore 
the difference between price change and price pressure, making it hard to determine the extent of 
the price pressure. Moreover, they focus on uninformed traders who influence the price, ignoring 
informed traders who exercise unsupported price pressure. Their approach is sufficient when a 
trader was partially or completely responsible for a price change, while being uninformed at the 
moment of trading. However, the approach is insufficient when the same trader was in possession 
of an information set. In that case, one should first determine the extent of the exercised and justi-
fied price pressure, before being able to judge the quality of the price pressure. In addition, when 
                                                        
47     Yadlin, supra note 3, at 842 (‘I distinguish between informed and uninformed ma-
nipulators. Both types of manipulators trade for the purpose of affecting the market price. But in-
formed manipulators are privy to information that leads them to believe that the market has mis-
priced the stock and that their effect on the market will better reflect the stock’s value.’). 
48     Frank H. Easterbrook, Monopoly, Manipulation, and the Regulation of Futures 
Markets, J. BUS. 103, 118 (1986) (‘The essential distinction between secret strategies necessary to 
capture the value of new information about underlying conditions and secrecy designed to cause 
prices to diverge from those that reflect the underlying conditions.’) 
  28 a trader has exercised unsupported price pressure, both the exercised and the justified price pres-
sure are necessary to determine the extent of the unsupported price pressure. 
  The papers of Gastineau & Jarrow
49 and Fischel & Ross
50 linked manipulation with unin-
formed profits. Again, this approach has merit, although one should develop the idea so that it 
may be implemented. For this purpose, the standard of unsupported price pressure is relevant. 
The following example illustrates why the extent of the exercised and justified price pressure are 
essential to estimate the uninformed profit. Consider a trader who possesses some information, 
knowing that the price of shares ABC will rise from $20 to $23. Next assume that this trader buys 
1,000 shares ABC and causes a price rise from $20 to $25 per share. Since the trader’s justified 
price pressure is +$3 and the trader’s exercised price pressure is +$5, the supported price pressure 
is +$3 and the unsupported price pressure is +$2. This is sufficient to determine both the extent of 
the informed and uninformed profit. Assume that the trader exercises the aforementioned price 
pressure right after he has signed a contract with another party to sell 100,000 shares ABC in a 
person-to-person deal, while the implicit and explicit costs of exercising the price pressure are 
negligible. Under these circumstances, he would have been able to reap an informed profit of 
$300,000 and an uninformed profit of $200,000, both on the contractual sale. 
 
                                                        
49     Gastineau & Jarrow, supra note 3, at 41 (‘[I]n the absence of information that sug-
gests a trading strategy will yield a positive, risk-adjusted return (…), the trader undertakes it 
anyway, expecting to profit from advantages related to size and intertemporal differences in mar-
ket impact.’). 
50   Fischel & Ross, supra note 3, at 510 (‘[T]he resulting profit comes solely from the 
trader’s ability to move prices and not from his possession of valuable information.’). 
  29 B.  The costs of unsupported price pressure 
  The preceding section illustrates why manipulation should be defined as ‘exercising unsup-
ported price pressure’. This section explores the dynamics of unsupported price pressure. Unsup-
ported price pressure causes welfare shifts between uninformed traders on the one hand and cor-
rective traders or manipulators on the other hand. These welfare shifts might drive away unin-
formed traders from the financial markets, resulting in reduced liquidity and societal costs. The 
following analysis shows that a prohibition of manipulation, which is in line with the ‘unsup-
ported price pressure’-standard, could discourage unsupported price pressure and, as such, in-
crease social welfare. 
 
1.  The framework 
  A model is used to analyze effects of idealized market transactions. The model includes four 
archetypical traders: (1) a manipulator, (2) a corrective trader, (3) an informed trader, and (4) an 
uninformed trader. I will give a short description of each of the traders and the quality of their 
price pressure.  
  In a standard manipulation scheme, the manipulator exercises upward unsupported price pres-
sure to raise the price, thereby creating an informational privilege. The manipulator is the only 
person who knows that the price is too high, which gives him an advantage over the other market 
participants. The manipulator then sells a large amount of shares at the inflated price, using his 
informational privilege. He will try to avoid or limit the exercise of downward supported price 
pressure, since he would otherwise discount information in the price and lose his informational 
privilege. A successful avoidance results in a profit.  
  30   Corrective traders compete with a manipulator from the moment he has exercised upward un-
supported price pressure. Their only goal is to discover manipulators and sell shares at the in-
flated price, thereby trying to minimize the exercise of downward supported price pressure and 
maximize their profit. Informed traders are the first to receive new information about the future 
of the company or market and will trade shares before other traders will be in the position to do 
so. They, however, do not react to manipulators and manipulative schemes. Informed traders en-
deavor to minimize the supported price pressure and maximize their profit.  
  Uninformed traders do not have any information about the future of the company or market, 
but trade on a regular base for various reasons, e.g., the investment of capital or the transfer of 
risk.
51 The uninformed traders limit the size of their transactions and do not create any relevant 
price pressure. They will sometimes trade with other uninformed traders and sometimes with the 
manipulator, corrective traders, or informed traders. The uninformed traders on average play even 
when they trade with each other. Otherwise, they will lose. 
  The formalization is as follows. The pre- and post-manipulation price at t and t+i can be any 
positive number. The model distinguishes between a manipulator exercising upward unsupported 
price pressure (M) and downward supported price pressure (O). A manipulator first exercises M, 
raising the price, before he unloads his shares at the inflated price and possibly exercises O. Fur-
thermore, corrective traders exercise downward supported price pressure (C), informed traders 
exercise either downward or upward price pressure (I), and uninformed traders exercise no or 
negligible price pressure (U). M, O, C, I and U are either positive for upward price pressure, 
negative for downward price pressure and zero for no price pressure. The relation is depicted in 
the following equation: 
                                                        
51     See, e.g., HARRIS, supra note 4, at 176-200. 
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M, I and U start at t+1, while O and C will not start before t+2. As a rule, if M is positive, O and 
C are negative and vice versa. It is important to note that mt+1 is always larger than or equal to 
ot+2 and ct+2, while mt+1 can be smaller than ot+3 and ct+3. The sum of mt+1, mt+2, ot+2, and ct+2 de-
termines the maximum of ot+3 and ct+3. The larger mt+1 and mt+2 and the smaller ot+2 and ct+2, the 





















2.  The analysis 
  The main question is to what extent a manipulator, defined as a trader who exercises unsup-
ported price pressure, creates societal costs. The goal is to examine the most relevant potential 
costs, not to cover all conceivable costs. A manipulator executes one-sided trades or two-sided 
trades. In case of one-sided trades, he only buys shares and exercises upward unsupported price 
pressure. So, the manipulator exercises M, but not O. In case of two-sided trades, the manipulator 
first buys shares, exercising upward unsupported price pressure, and then sells shares to take an 
advantage of the unsupported price pressure. The manipulator exercises M and possibly O. Both 
one-sided and two-sided trades cause welfare shifts between uninformed traders and corrective 
traders. In case of two-sided trades, the manipulator further sells shares at the inflated price and 
  32 benefits at the expense of uninformed traders, provided that he minimizes O. All these welfare 
shifts might drive away uninformed traders from the financial markets, resulting in reduced li-
quidity and societal costs. The relation between unsupported price pressure and societal costs will 
be discussed in more detail in the following paragraphs. 
 
a.  One-sided trades and welfare shifts 
  Few manipulators buy shares and exercise upward unsupported price pressure without selling 
shares to take advantage of the unsupported price pressure. It is costly to create unsupported price 
pressure and therefore taking a profit, by unloading a large number of shares at the inflated price, 
is the rational outcome. Nevertheless, there will always be some manipulators who miss their 
trading opportunity. One can think of several scenarios where this occurs. A manipulator, who 
has exercised unsupported price pressure and initially is in the position to make a profit by 
unloading a large amount of shares, may pull back because the opportunity disappears quickly or 
the scheme appears to be too risky or too transparent. Secondly, a trader who exercises unsup-
ported price pressure may be unaware that he actually did so and consequently will not think of 
unloading shares at the inflated price. Such an ignorant trader might qualify as a manipulator, es-
pecially when his ignorance is reprehensible and the extent of the unsupported price pressure is 
large. Notwithstanding the cause of one-sided trades, the trader produces: (1) extra volatility; and 
(2) extra information asymmetries. We will discuss both of these effects.   
  Extra Volatility – Adding volatility to the market has its own welfare effects. A manipulator 
will either increase or decrease the risk of a single stock. If unsupported price pressure results in 
extra volatility, it increases the risk. Conversely, if unsupported price pressure mitigates the price 
  33 variance, it decreases the risk.
52 There are three relevant situations. Firstly, the manipulator exer-
cises upward M, while there is no other price pressure, causing volatility by definition. Secondly, 
upward M is in line with the accumulation of C and I. For example, M is +$2, while C is +$3 and 
I is -$1. In this situation, the manipulator increases volatility. Thirdly, upward M is contrary to 
the accumulation of C and I. For example, M is +$2, while C is -$3 and I is -$1. The manipulator 
mitigates the volatility; however, he does this temporarily. The manipulator will shortly after-
wards exercise O or induce corrective traders to exercise C, increasing volatility. Therefore, the 
conclusion is that a manipulator raises volatility on average. 
  Costs of extra volatility – What happens after a manipulator has exercised M? Traders who 
buy at an inflated price transfer wealth to investors who sell at an inflated price. This is not auto-
matically a problem. A manipulator will not create costs to risk neutral traders if they are as 
likely to lose from buying at a deflated price as they are to gain from selling at an inflated price. 
Further, the manipulator will not thwart risk averse traders, provided that they have a well-
diversified stock portfolio. According to modern portfolio theory, investors with a well-
diversified portfolio are able to exclude unsystematic risk, which is risk associated with individ-
ual assets. Nevertheless, a manipulator creates costs to risk-averse traders with a poorly diversi-
fied portfolio. Hence, the manipulator causes extra volatility and drives away this group of trad-
ers from the financial markets. The reduction in liquidity could result in societal costs.
53  
                                                        
52     Cf. Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of “Inaccurate” Stock 
Prices, 41 DUKE L.J. 977, 1026 (1992).  
53     Unsupported price pressure might have an influence on the size of the bid-ask 
spread, since liquidity providers discount the stock price volatility and the extra risk. See Hans R. 
Stoll, Market Microstructure, in HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCE (VOL. 1A, CORPO-
RATE FINANCE) 562-563 (George M. Constantinides ed., 2003). 
  34   Extra information asymmetries –A manipulator does not only create extra volatility, but also 
extra information asymmetries. Indeed, a manipulator inflates the stock price and consequently 
creates information asymmetries between him and the uninformed market segment. The idea that 
a manipulator establishes an informational advantage is straightforward. Consider a manipulator 
who exercises upward M of +$5, while there are no other forms of price pressure, thereby slowly 
inflating the price from $10 to $15. The manipulator has created an informational advantage: he 
knows that his own activities are the source of the price rise, while the uninformed market seg-
ment lacks this information. Even though the manipulator endeavors to protect his information 
privilege as long as possible, he cannot prevent that some corrective traders in the end will re-
ceive a comparable informational privilege, especially when he is not able to camouflage fully his 
identity. 
  Costs of extra information asymmetries – What happens after a manipulator has exercised M? 
As the manipulator buys shares at a price above the fundamental value to exercise unsupported 
price pressure, he attracts relatively more corrective traders than uninformed traders. Thus, com-
paratively speaking, a manipulator buys more shares from corrective traders than from unin-
formed traders, benefiting the corrective traders more than the uninformed traders. If the manipu-
lator, after having exercised unsupported price pressure, does not unload a large amount of 
shares, corrective traders replace the manipulator, selling shares to the uninformed traders at the 
inflated price until the price returns to the original level. The conclusion is that a manipulator cre-
ates extra information asymmetries and benefits corrective traders vis-à-vis uninformed traders. 
  35 They thus drive away uninformed traders from the financial markets. The reduced liquidity may 
again result in societal costs.
54
 
b.  Two-sided trades and welfare shifts 
  Most manipulators execute both buy and sell transactions to make a profit. The question is to 
what extent two-sided trades create societal costs. The analysis is limited to a manipulator who 
first purchases shares to inflate the price and then sells shares to profit from the inflated price. 
This will either lead to symmetric or asymmetric price pressure. Envision a manipulator who 
purchases 1,000 shares and inflates the price from $10 to $15, while there are no other forms of 
price pressure. When he sells 1,000 shares and the price returns to $10, it is a case of symmetric 
price pressure. On the other hand, if he sells more than 1,000 shares before the price returns at 
$10, it is a situation of asymmetric price pressure. The analysis ignores manipulators who create 
symmetric price pressure, as they will not make any profit and do not produce any other costs 
than already discussed. Let us distinguish between a manipulator who exercises asymmetric price 
pressure: (1) in the same financial market; and (2) in different financial markets. We will discuss 
how traders can make a profit and if this results in societal costs.   
  Two-sided trades in the same market - The manipulator first buys shares, creating large up-
ward unsupported price pressure, and then sells shares, creating little downward supported price 
pressure. Imagine the following example. A manipulator buys 5,000 shares and exercises upward 
M of +$1, whereupon he sells 10,000 shares and exercises downward O of -$1. Obviously, the 
                                                        
54   Informational asymmetries are an explanation for the size of the bid-ask spread. Id., 
at 563. Since information asymmetries increase the bid-ask spread, some traders might leave the 
market and reduce the liquidity.  
  36 upward price pressure exceeds the downward price pressure. For expositional clarity, we assume 
that the manipulator pays on average an extra 0.55M per share and receives an extra -0.45O per 
share, that is he pays an extra $0.55 per share and receives an extra $0.45 per share.
55 The ma-
nipulator will face a payout of (-$0.55 * 5,000) + ($0.45 * 10,000) or $1750. If the manipulator 
competes with corrective traders, his payout will be (-$0.55 * 5,000) + ((1-x) * $0.55 * 10,000), 
where (1-x) is a measure of the power to capitalize M. 
  The likelihood of societal costs – In theory, a manipulator is able to make a profit at the ex-
pense of uninformed traders. This could drive away uninformed traders from the financial mar-
kets, reducing market liquidity and creating societal costs. It remains to be seen whether manipu-
lators in practice are able to make a profit. According to the cogent analysis of Fischel and Ross, 
making a profit may be unlikely. In practice, M is usually counterbalanced by O.
56 Even though 
Thel largely endorses the principle that profitable manipulation is difficult, he rightly points out 
the importance of under- and overreactions.
57 Nevertheless, as long as empirical research has not 
produced profound insights in the causes and circumstances of these mixed reactions, it is hard to 
draw any conclusions about market reforms or regulation. The idea that manipulators cannot sys-
tematically reap profits through contrary trades in the same market is supported by recent empiri-
cal studies on the information content of suspected trades. These studies show that many so-
                                                        
55     This assumption is based on the following example. The price and the fundamental 
value of a share is $5. A trader, for example, buys 500 shares at $5.1, 500 shares at $5.2, 500 
shares at $5.3 and so on until the price reaches $6. He will then sell 1,000 shares at $5.9, 1,000 
shares at $5.8, 1,000 shares at $5.7 and so on until the price reaches $5. Cf. HARRIS, supra note 4, 
at 270-273. 
56     Fischel & Ross, supra note 3, at 517-519. 
57     Thel, supra note 4, at 261-267. 
  37 called manipulative transactions were probably informed trades.
58 However, there is also evi-
dence that pump and dump schemes might occur and be profitable.
59 Considering the mixed evi-
dence, it is best to conclude that there is not enough proof of manipulative profits and therefore 
societal costs. 
Two-sided trades in different markets – The Article started with an example of a trader who 
combines trading on the exchange and deal making outside the exchange. If the manipulator buys 
5,000 shares ABC on the exchange and exercises M of +$1, while contractual rights allow him to 
sell 1 million shares off the exchange at the inflated price, he is able to make a profit. This is true 
as long the trader minimizes the costs of exercising M and keeps O at a minimum. Again, we as-
sume that the manipulator pays on average an extra 0.55M per share. However, since he sells 
shares in a person-to-person deal, he does not cause any O during the sale. Under these circum-
stances and assumptions, the manipulator makes a profit of (-$0.55 * 5,000) + ($1 * 1 million) or 
$997,250. The trader has to consider the influence of corrective traders. If the manipulator in-
flates the price of shares ABC and corrective traders deflate the price before the manipulator is 
able to capitalize M, his payout will be (-$0.55 * 5,000) + ((1-x) * $1 * 1 million), where (1-x) is 
a measure of the power to capitalize M. In a similar way, the trader could combine trading on dif-
ferent exchanges. He might trade shares ABC close to the expiration date of options ABC to in-
fluence the price of the latter and, therefore, make a profit. 
                                                        
58     Jiang, Mahoney & Mei, supra note 5, and Mahoney, supra note 5, find no evi-
dence that stock pools were engaged in unsupported manipulation. 
59     See, e.g., Asim I. Khwaja & Atif Mian, Unchecked Intermediaries: Price Manipu-
lation in an Emerging Stock Market, 78 J. FINAN. ECON. 203 (2005); Aggerwal & Wu, supra note 
2. 
  38 The likelihood of societal costs – It is reasonable to believe that manipulators in practice are 
able to make a profit by trading in different markets: buying in a market where prices are dy-
namic and selling in a market where prices are static. As the manipulator makes a profit, the unin-
formed market incurs a loss. Consequently, the manipulator might drive away uninformed traders 
and reduce liquidity, creating some societal costs.
60 Fischel & Ross, Thel and Yadlin have de-
scribed several real-life situations and case law in which manipulators may have benefited.
61 The 
authors agree that manipulation every now and then is profitable. According to Fischel and Ross, 
contract-based manipulation is ‘not clearly self-deterring because the gains of triggering the con-
tractual right could outweigh the losses incurred by the alleged manipulator at the time of sale’.
62 
Thel concludes that ‘contracts in which rights are contingent upon reported security prices create 
tempting opportunities for manipulation’.
63 Likewise, Yadlin believes ‘there are circumstances in 
which manipulation is profitable’.
64 Overseeing the real-life situations and case law, it is plausi-
ble that manipulators sometimes make a profit and therefore cause societal costs.  
  The objective of the foregoing discussion was to show that a trader who exercises unsupported 
price pressure may create societal costs, even when he does not profit from trading. Thus a prohi-
bition on manipulation may discourage unsupported price pressure and as such increase social 
welfare. 
                                                        
60     Since I aim to define manipulation and not to discuss the justification of regula-
tion, I will ignore the fact that they disagree about the necessary policy implications. Fischel and 
Ross argue that the societal costs of regulation are high, making the solution worse than the prob-
lem. Fischel & Ross, supra note 3, at 553. Thel believes that regulation will have a necessary de-
terrent effect. Thel, supra note 4, at 296-298. 
61     Fischel & Ross, supra note 3, at 527-534; Thel, supra note 4, at 247-261. 
62     Fischel & Ross, supra note 3, at 523. 
63     Thel, supra note 4, at 261. See also Yadlin, supra note 3, at 841-842. 
64     Yadlin, supra note 3, at 841. 
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IV.  POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
A.  The definition of manipulation 
  Having introduced an improved definition of manipulation, ‘exercising unsupported price 
pressure’, the focus is on some contemporary thoughts about prohibitions on manipulation. The 
first policy implication is the design of future prohibitions on manipulation. The second policy 
implication is accentuating current prohibitions on manipulation by using the ‘unsupported price 
pressure’-standard.  
 
1.  Future prohibitions 
  At some stage, legislators, in countries without a prohibition on manipulation in place or in 
countries with an intention to change existing prohibitions, may want to explore the various op-
tions to design or change one. I do not claim that countries should expand their legal systems 
with a prohibition, but if they prefer so, they should design policy in line with the ‘unsupported 
price pressure’-standard. The most elementary prohibition bans traders who execute transactions 
that result in unsupported price pressure. The legislator then has to decide if and how he wants to 
restrict the application of the prohibition. He could opt for: (1) a restricted prohibition, indemni-
fying traders who exercise unsupported price pressure and do not expect to benefit (as discussed 
below); (2) a materiality standard, excluding minor forms of unsupported price pressure (Section 
IV.B.); and/ or (3) a mens rea element, excluding traders who can be declared innocent (Section 
IV.C.). 
  40   A legislator has to choose between a broad and a restricted prohibition. The broad prohibition 
includes all traders who exercise unsupported price pressure. The core of the prohibition would 
be as follows: ‘it is prohibited to execute transactions that result in unsupported price pressure’. 
The restricted prohibition excludes traders who exercise unsupported price pressure and do not 
expect to benefit. The core of the prohibition would provide: ‘it is prohibited to execute transac-
tions that result in unsupported price pressure and go together with an expected unsupported 
profit’. The advantage of the broad prohibition is that it applies to traders who exercise large un-
supported price pressure and create significant societal costs, even if they are not in the position 
to make a profit (Section III.B.2.a.). Because of the advantage, it is reasonable to believe that leg-
islators will opt for a broad prohibition. The remainder of this Article is based on this assumption. 
 
2.  Contemporary prohibitions 
The next question is how legislators can accentuate Section 10(b) SEA 1934, Rule 10b-5, Section 
9(a)(2) SEA 1934, Section 1(2)(a) DMA 2003, and Section 1(2)(a) DMA 2003. 
  Section 10(b) SEA 1934 and Rule 10b-5 apply to ‘any manipulative or deceptive device or 
contrivance’ and ‘any act (…) which operates (…) as a fraud or deceit upon any person’. Both 
provisions could be more focused in the context of manipulation. If the regulator interprets the 
provisions in line with the ‘unsupported price pressure’-standard, he would clearly communicate 
to the market that traders are allowed to influence the stock price as long as they discount new in-
formation in the price and exercise supported price pressure. So, a trader would only violate Sec-
tion 10(b) SEA 1934 or Rule 10b-5 and employ a ‘manipulative or deceptive device or contriv-
ance’ or an ‘act (…) which operates (…) as a fraud or deceit upon any person’ if he at least exer-
cises unsupported price pressure. Besides, the regulator could take into account the extent of the 
  41 unsupported price pressure and the culpability. Consequently, traders do not have to err on the 
side of caution and are encouraged to enter into welfare-enhancing transactions. 
  Section 9(a)(2) SEA 1934 refers to transactions raising or depressing the price of a security.
65 
A first shortcoming of the prohibition is that it applies to both transactions resulting in unsup-
ported price pressure and supported price pressure. If a trader executes transactions, exercises 
supported price pressure, and causes the price to change, he technically violates the prohibition. 
Even though the prohibition is pretty broad at face value, it should be interpreted narrow.
66 For 
example, the court in Trane v. O’Conner concluded that a risk arbitrageur was allowed to cause a 
price change, because he ‘was convinced that Trane was a ready target for unusual corporate ac-
tivity in the form of a merger, take over or tender offer’.
67 Even though the application of Section 
9(a)(2) SEA 1934 is limited through case law, this has not established a crystal clear distinction 
between supported and unsupported price pressure. It is recommendable to restrict the application 
of the prohibition to traders who exercise unsupported price pressure. 
  A second shortcoming of Section 9(a)(2) SEA 1934 is that it only applies to traders who cre-
ate or reinforce a price change and not to traders who stabilize the price or mitigate price 
changes. Consider a trader exercising upward unsupported price pressure of +$1, while the rest of 
the market exercises downward price pressure of -$1 respectively -$2. The trader does not raise 
                                                        
65     See also Thel, supra note 4, at 221, note 17 (referring to ‘buying a security for the 
purpose of increasing the reported price or selling a security for the purpose of decreasing the re-
ported price’) 
66     H.R. REP. NO. 792, 73
rd Cong., 2
nd Sess. (1934), at 20 (‘Of course, any extensive 
purchases or sales are bound to cause changes in the market price of the security.  If a person is 
merely trying to acquire a large block (…), or desires to dispose of a big holding, his knowledge 
that in doing so he will affect the market price does not make his action unlawful.’). Cf. S.R. REP. 
NO. 792, 73
rd Cong., 2
nd Sess. (1934), at 17. 
67     Trane v. O’Conner, 561 F.Supp. 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), at 304. 
  42 or depress the price, but stabilizes the price respectively mitigates the price change. If Section 
9(a)(2) SEA 1934 would be replaced with the ‘unsupported price pressure’-standard, it would 
clearly cover transactions that raise or depress the price and transactions that stabilize the price or 
mitigate price changes. Section 9(a)(2) SEA 1934 could also be interpreted in line with the pro-
posed standard, so that the provision is applicable to all traders who exercises unsupported price 
pressure, irrespective of the price influence. Anyhow, I would prefer a replacement, as an exten-
sive interpretation would be fairly forced. 
  Section 1(2)(a) DMA 2003 applies to traders who execute transactions and bring the price to 
an abnormal price. The prohibition does not define ‘abnormal level’ and there is no relevant sec-
ondary legislation. Besides, as the European prohibition is new, there is yet no relevant case law. 
At first glance, the prohibition applies to traders increasing the price from $10 to $11, provided 
that the price had previously been stable at $10 for a sufficient period of time. Nevertheless, an 
adequate prohibition allows traders who execute supported price pressure and bans traders who 
exercise unsupported price pressure. If Section 1(2)(a) DMA 2003 is interpreted in line with the 
‘unsupported price pressure’-standard, it would only be applicable to traders exercising unsup-
ported price pressure. From an economic perspective, it is reasonable to say that a trader who ex-
ercises supported price pressure causes a normal stock price, while a trader who exercises unsup-
ported price pressure causes an abnormal stock price. 
  There is another question to be answered. Let us assume that the regulator interprets Section 
1(2)(a) DMA 2003 in line with the ‘unsupported price pressure’-standard. Then the prohibition is 
definitely applicable to traders exercising unsupported price pressure and creating or reinforcing 
a price change. But it remains unclear whether the prohibition applies to traders exercising un-
supported price pressure, thereby stabilizing the price or mitigating a price change. One could ar-
  43 gue that a trader who stabilizes a price or mitigates a price change does not create an abnormal 
price. As already stated, the prohibition does not define ‘abnormal level’ and there is no relevant 
secondary legislation. This leaves room for an extensive interpretation. It is advisable to interpret 
the prohibition in such way that it applies to traders exercising unsupported price pressure and 
thereby affecting stock prices.
68 By doing so, the regulator is able to take action in all situations, 
no matter whether traders create, reinforce, stabilize or mitigate a price change. 
    Furthermore, legislators every so often design prohibitions to counteract traders who cause 
artificial prices.
69 Section 1041A CA 2001 refers to transactions that have the effect of creating 
an artificial price or maintaining it at a level that is artificial, while Section 1(2)(a) DMA 2003 
prohibits transactions which bring or secure the price at an artificial level. Obviously, these pro-
hibitions distinguish between traders creating non-artificial prices and traders creating artificial 
prices. The first group of traders acts legitimately, while the second group acts illegitimately. The 
problem remains that these prohibitions lack a precise delineation of ‘non-artificial price’ versus 
‘artificial price’. As a result, a regulator is free to use the prohibitions to counteract various trans-
actions, i.e., all transactions raising or depressing the price, uninformed transactions raising or 
depressing the price, transactions having the purpose of raising or depressing the price, and/ or 
transactions moving the price away from the fundamental value. 
                                                        
68     See also Norman S. Poser, Stock Market Manipulation and Corporate Control 
Transactions, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 671, 731 (1986) (A trader might manipulate even though he is 
not interested in ‘affecting (emphasis added) stock prices as an end in itself’.); James H. Mathias, 
Manipulative Practice and The Securities Exchange Act, 3 U. PITT. L. REV. 7, 7 (1936) (Manipu-
lation is ‘a planned effort to affect (emphasis added) the market price of a security by artificial 
means’.). 
69     See also James W. Moore & Frank M. Wiseman, Market Manipulation and the 
Exchange Act, 2 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 50 (1934) (‘Manipulation leads to an artificial (emphasis 
added) and controlled price.’) 
  44   Thus chances are that the regulator falsely employs Section 1041A CA 2001 or Section 1(2)(a) 
DMA 2003 in situations of supported price pressure or erroneously ignores the prohibition in 
situations of unsupported price pressure. Both mistakes will most likely result in societal costs. If 
the regulator uses the prohibition in situations of supported price pressure, he falsely qualifies a 
legitimate trader as a manipulator, and when he ignores the prohibition in situations of unsup-
ported price pressure, he erroneously indemnifies a manipulator. A regulator would reduce these 
risks by interpreting the prohibitions in line with the ‘unsupported price pressure’-standard, so 
that the distinction between non-artificial prices and artificial prices is well-defined. The reason-
ing is as follows: In the event that a trader exercises supported price pressure, he creates a non-
artificial price and is a legitimate trader. On the other hand, when the trader exercises unsup-
ported price pressure, he creates an artificial price and might qualify as a manipulator.  
  
B.  The materiality standard 
  Section IV.A. explained how legislators have to design a new prohibition on manipulation and 
how regulators could interpret current prohibitions. The following analysis concentrates on the 
extent of the unsupported price pressure. Prohibitions on manipulation may benefit from a mate-
riality standard, just like the prohibition on information-based manipulation and insider trading 
does. 
 
  45 1.  The basics of the materiality standard 
  Economic and legal scholars often consider manipulation to be binary. Traders are either in-
formed or uninformed.
70 If the trader is informed and influences the stock price, he is no manipu-
lator. On the other hand, if the trader is uninformed and influences the stock price, he might qual-
ify as a manipulator. This binary approach shows little similarities with real-life situations. Both 
informed traders and uninformed traders are able to exercise unsupported price pressure. Accord-
ingly, the regulator cannot rely just on the suspect’s information position. He should always de-
termine both the exercised price pressure and the justified price pressure before drawing any con-
clusions. Having determined both exercised price pressure and justified price pressure, he is able 
to calculate the extent of the unsupported price pressure. This step-by-step plan has been de-
scribed in Section III.A. 
  Consider the following examples. If a trader exercises a price pressure of +$5, while in pos-
session of information pointing at future supported price pressure of +$4.5, the unsupported price 
pressure is +$0.5. On the other hand, if the exercised price pressure is +$5 and the trader is in 
possession of information pointing at future supported price pressure of +$0.5, the unsupported 
price pressure is +$4.5. Clearly, the extent of the unsupported price pressure and possibly the size 
of the societal costs vary significantly. It would be impractical and unwise to maintain a prohibi-
                                                        
70     Aggarwal & Wu, supra note 2, at 1935 (‘[A] key to successful manipulation is the 
pooling of the manipulator with the informed party. Hence, the manipulator needs to be able to 
credibly pose as a potentially informed party.’); HARRIS, supra note 4, at 266 (‘Bluffers behave 
as though they are informed speculators, and they hope that others will believe they are well-
informed speculators, but they do not have well-founded opinions about values.’); Yadlin, supra 
note 3, at 842 (‘(…) I distinguish between informed and uninformed manipulators. Both types of 
manipulators trade for affecting the market price. But informed manipulators are privy to private 
information that leads them to believe that the market has mispriced the stock and their effect on 
the market will better reflect that stock’s value.’); Mahoney, supra note 5, at 354-355 (‘An easily 
tested alternative to the manipulation hypothesis is that the pools were informed.’).  
  46 tion on manipulation that covers any situation of unsupported price pressure. There is no need to 
prohibit minor forms of unsupported price pressure, as the price influence and societal costs are 
negligible. Besides, traders may become reluctant to execute welfare-enhancing trades. This 
might have a negative impact on market operations.  
  In order to mitigate the negative consequences of a too strict regime, a materiality standard 
with respect to the extent of the unsupported price pressure is desirable. This should not be a 
formal and codified materiality standard as in most prohibitions on information-based manipula-
tion and insider trading, but an informal and voluntary materiality standard to which the regulator 
could adhere. A formal materiality standard would result in a high burden of proof. The regulator 
should take into account the materiality of the unsupported price pressure in case he has a reliable 
estimate. A materiality standard would not only encourage traders to trade competitively, but also 
create systematic consistency. The US and EU prohibitions on trade-based market manipulation 
currently do not have an explicit materiality standard, while the US and EU prohibitions on in-
formation-based manipulation and on insider trading do.
71
  The application of a materiality standard, with an eye on the new definitions herein, would be 
as follows: The regulator first determines the extent of the exercised and justified price pressure, 
e.g., +$3 and +$2, before calculating the extent of the unsupported price pressure, that is +$1. 
The regulator then decides what the minimal level of unsupported price pressure ought to be, e.g., 
+$2. This normative judgment is usually based on a comparative assessment between the institu-
                                                        
71      The materiality standard would allow market participants to exercise little unsup-
ported price pressure, even when they expect a profit. The reason is straightforward: companies 
and other market participants would otherwise become reluctant to execute transactions that re-
sult in little unsupported price pressure, while the costs of these trades are negligible. Likewise, 
companies are allowed to spread untrue or misleading information as long as it has a small im-
pact, while management can legitimately use inside information as long as it is immaterial. 
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regulation, he sets the minimal level very low. Conversely, if the regulator believes in liberal se-
curities regulation, the minimal level is high. A market participant risks a violation of the prohibi-
tion on manipulation if the extent of the unsupported price pressure exceeds the minimal level. In 
the foregoing example, the unsupported price pressure of +$1 is irrelevant, considering the mini-
mal level of +$2. 
 
2.  The correction of the materiality standard 
  So far, for expositional clarity, the discussion has been limited to the materiality of the unsup-
ported price pressure, ignoring the materiality of the unsupported profit. Immaterial unsupported 
price pressure, however, sometimes results in a large unsupported profit. A regulator, who ad-
heres to the described materiality standard, does not take measures against immaterial unsup-
ported price pressure, even when this goes together with a large unsupported profit. Such deci-
sion is undesirable, as the societal costs may be large. A regulator should look at both the extent 
of the unsupported price pressure and the size of the unsupported profit. In the end, it is not only 
the extent of the unsupported price pressure but also the size of the unsupported profit that is a 
good indicator of the societal costs. Therefore, the regulator should fine immaterial unsupported 
price pressure as long as it results in a large unsupported profit. 
  The regulator should investigate whether the unsupported price pressure was material. If this is 
not the case, he should assess whether any unsupported profit was material. However, should the 
  48 regulator estimate the expected profit
72 or the realized profit
73? There are a few practical argu-
ments to focus on expected profit. Firstly, the proof of an expected profit is less complicated than 
the proof of a realized profit. Indeed, the regulator only has to prove that a trader exercised un-
supported price pressure, while he could expect to profit from his action in the near future. Sec-
ondly, the prohibition would apply to both traders who attempt to manipulate the market and 
traders who are actually successful. Accordingly, this approach prevents a complex distinction 
between failing and successful manipulators. It is wise to perform just a marginal investigation 
with respect to the extent of the unsupported profit. 
  As already stated, an informal materiality standard with respect to the extent of the unsup-
ported price pressure is desirable. Likewise, an informal materiality standard as to the unsup-
ported profit could be beneficial. Consider the following example in which both materiality stan-
dards are explained. Imagine a trader who buys 1,000 shares ABC and exercises price pressure of 
+$0.5, so that the price of shares ABC rises from $20 tot $20.5 per share. Assume that the trader 
has an informational privilege, knowing that the price should be $20.3. This means that the trader 
has exercised supported price pressure of +$0.3 and unsupported price pressure of +$0.2. If the 
regulator adheres to the materiality standard and qualifies the unsupported price pressure of +$0.2 
irrelevant, he cannot apply the prohibition and fine the behavior, except when the unsupported 
profit and the societal costs are large.  
                                                        
72     Economic models of manipulation fulfill the rational actor assumption by using 
expected profit. See, e.g., Gastineau & Jarrow, supra note 3, at 41 ‘[T]he trader undertakes it 
anyway, expecting to profit (emphasis added) from advantages related to size and intertemporal 
differences in market impact.’). 
73     Cf. Fischel & Ross, supra note 3, at 510 (‘Manipulative trades could be defined as 
profitable trades (emphasis added) (…)’; ‘(…) the resulting profit (emphasis added) comes 
solely from the trader’s ability to move prices and not from his possession of valuable informa-
tion’.). 
  49   The regulator will have to assess the unsupported profit. Having exercised price pressure of 
+$0.5, the trader sells 1 million shares ABC in a contractual person-to-person deal, while the 
price of this deal is derived from the price on the exchange. By exercising price pressure of 
+$0.5, the trader makes a total profit of $500,000. Assuming that the costs of exercising unsup-
ported price pressure are small and that corrective traders were absent, one can calculate that the 
supported profit was as large as $300,000 and the unsupported profit $200,000. If the regulator 
has the ability to discover the extent of the unsupported profit, he then has to set a minimal level, 
depending on his ideas about the level of investor protection. He has a reason to fine the unsup-
ported price pressure if the unsupported profit, which is $200,000, is larger than the minimal size 
of the unsupported profit, e.g., when the minimum level is $50,000. 
 
C.  Mens rea elements 
  Having reduced the definition of manipulation to ‘exercising unsupported price pressure’, 
there is a smaller role for the mens rea than many authors claim. Indeed, if a regulator would 
adopt the proposed standard, traders are protected as long as they execute supported price pres-
sure. Nonetheless, the legislator is free to take up a mens rea element. By doing so, the legislator 
would protect traders who are not culpable of exercising unsupported price pressure. 
 
1.  The relevance of the mens rea 
  Normally, a legislator develops a prohibition in a natural sequence. He might want to prohibit 
certain behavior because of the supposed societal costs. After a legislator has decided to do so, he 
could include a mens rea element, emphasizing culpability. Many legal systems prefer prohibi-
  50 tions that include a mens rea element. According to general consensus, one should keep punish-
ment abreast of culpability. However, legal systems generally do not require this proportionality, 
especially when it comes to economic crimes. They allow for a ‘strict liability’-regime, which 
does not take into account culpability.
74 Legislators regularly design prohibitions that cover 
harmful economic activities without any reference to the mens rea. The idea is that these activi-
ties have a large impact and as such should be prohibited, irrespective of the culpability of the de-
fendant. Yet, even under such a strict liability-regime offenders usually have the opportunity to 
make a claim to various mens rea defenses.  
  Since this Article shows that the legislator is able to objectively define manipulation, while le-
gal systems allow legislators to design prohibitions according to ‘strict liability’, it is remarkable 
that scholars often automatically link manipulation with a mens rea element.
75 Some scholars 
                                                        
74     See, e.g., for the US, SANFORD H. KADISH AND STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMI-
NAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 235-237 (2001) (‘While the general rule at common law was that 
scienter was a necessary element in the indictment and proof of every crime (…), there has been 
a modification of this view in respect to prosecutions under statutes the purpose of which would 
be obstructed by such a requirement.’) and for the EU, Saliabaku v. France (1988) 13 EHRR 379 
(‘In particular, and again in principle, the Contracting States may, under certain conditions, pe-
nalize a simple or objective fact as such, irrespective of whether it results from criminal intent or 
from negligence. Examples of such offences may be found in the laws of the Contracting 
States.’). 
75     See, e.g., Yadlin, supra note 3, at 840 (‘(…) I define stock manipulation as the 
buying (or selling) of a security for the purpose of increasing (or depressing) its market price.’); 
Thel, supra note 4, at 221, n. 17 (‘[T]he word “manipulation” means buying a security for the 
purpose of increasing the reported price or selling a security for the purpose of decreasing the re-
ported price.’); Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange 
Act, 42 STAN. L. REV. 385, 393 (1990) (‘[M]anipulation means anything in particular, it means 
conduct intended to induce people to trade a security or force its price to an artificial level’); Note 
Yale Law Journal, supra note 86, at 624 (‘Manipulation is the generic term used to identify the 
employment of such stimuli for the primary purpose of controlling the prices or the volume of 
transactions of securities traded on the exchanges.’); Mathias, supra note 65, at 7 (‘Manipulation, 
which may be defined as a planned effort to affect the market price of a security by artificial 
means, has been a troublesome problem for centuries.’). 
  51 even claim that one can only delineate manipulation by evaluating the state of mind.
76 For exam-
ple, Fischel and Ross have argued that ‘there is no objective definition of manipulation’. Accord-
ing to them, ‘[t]he only definition that makes any sense is subjective’. Fischel and Ross put for-
ward a couple of arguments to underpin these statements. They, however, stress in fact the impor-
tance of a well-defined objective side of manipulation rather than the importance of the mens rea. 
Indeed, the suggested ‘unsupported price pressure’-standard would remove most of the advanced 
problems, even without reference to the mens rea.
77
                                                        
76     See, e.g., Ferrarini, supra note 3, at 724 (‘The Directive does not include any ref-
erence to intent, which is often considered as an essential element of manipulation.’; ‘[I]t is 
doubtful that manipulation can be adequately defined by omitting any reference to intent.’); Jes-
per L. Hansen, The New Proposal for a European Union Directive on Market Abuse, 23 U. PA. J. 
INT’L ECON. L. 241 (2002), 267 (‘Some of these examples are acceptable, such as wash sales. 
Others bristle with difficulties, such as trading specifically to interfere with the spot or the settle-
ment price of derivative contracts. Here, an evaluation of the person’s state of mind seems neces-
sary.’); GOLDWASSER, supra note 3, at 109-110 (‘The line between legitimate and manipulative 
trading is a very thin one. The distinction depends upon proof of the requisite intent on the part of 
the defendant.’); Vauplane & Simart, supra note 1, at 229 (‘Paramount Importance of the Intent 
Element (heading)’); Poser, supra note 65, at 729 (‘Where a person is accused of manipulating a 
stock through trading, his activities (…) are in themselves consistent with the perfectly innocuous 
(…) purpose of making a profit. This is in contrast with other manipulative techniques, such as 
false statements, bribery, or fictitious transactions, which, being deceptive or at least wrongful in 
themselves, require a less specific intent to make them manipulative.’). 
77     Fischel en Ross, supra note 3, at 509-510. Their first argument is that ‘traders with 
private information who disguise their trades with the effect that prices do not move in the correct 
direction, or even move in the wrong direction, also trade with “good” intent and thus are not en-
gaged in manipulation because the ultimate profit is attributable to the private information they 
possess.’ This group of traders, however, does not need the protection of ‘good intent’, since 
traders who protect their information will not cause any price pressure. And if they do cause price 
pressure, it will most likely be supported. Fischel and Ross further raise the question ‘what hap-
pens if the trades move prices in one direction because the trader genuinely believes that prices 
will move in this direction, but the trader turns out to be wrong and prices ultimately move in the 
opposite direction?’ Their answer is that ‘[t]rading based on a genuine belief that prices will ulti-
mately move in the direction of the trades is the essence of non-manipulative trading.’ But the 
standard of unsupported price pressure is sufficient in this case. A trader with a weak belief is al-
lowed to exercise little price pressure. In addition, a trader with significant information can exer-
cise large price pressure. If traders follow this rule of thumb, they will exercise supported price 
pressure. 
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claim that a prohibition should emphasize the objective side of manipulation, not overstressing 
the mens rea. If a legislator designs a prohibition in line with the ‘unsupported price pressure’-
standard, the introduction of a mens rea element is at the most optional. The description of costly 
behavior, namely exercising unsupported price pressure, is disconnected from the culpability. 
Conversely, if a legislator has designed a prohibition that is too broad, in the sense that it covers 
more situations than ‘exercising unsupported price pressure’, a legislator could better rethink the 
objective side then recover the definition with a mens rea element. Rethinking the objective side 
secures the quality and transparency of jurisdiction, while continuing a broad prohibition replaces 
the individual assessment of the ‘unsupported price pressure’ and the ‘culpability’ with a single 
assessment of the mens rea, which results in a mingling of different elements.  
 
2.  The implementation of the mens rea 
  Should the suggested prohibition on manipulation, which is completely objective, incorporate 
a mens rea element to include culpability? Some people will claim that an adequate prohibition 
merely applies to traders who are culpable of exercising unsupported price pressure. Other people 
will argue that a prohibition with a mens rea element raises the burden of proof in an unjustifi-
able way. Taking a stance in this legal doctrinal debate is beyond the scope of the current Article. 
Nevertheless, if a legislator prefers a prohibition with a mens rea element, he will have to think 
about the design of this element. Most discussions on the prohibition on manipulation ignore this 
question. A legislator could grosso modo design the mens rea element in line with the mens rea 
elements in the prohibition on information-based manipulation and the prohibition on insider 
trading. 
  53   The US and EU regimes against information-based manipulation prescribe that the person was 
at least ‘reckless’. Basically, under Rule 10b-5, the regulator has to prove that the person was 
reckless as regards to the information deficiency.
78 Likewise, under the European prohibition on 
information-based manipulation, the regulator should prove that the person knew or was reckless 
in not knowing about the information deficiency.
79 Furthermore, the US and EU regimes against 
insider trading require that there is some type of ‘knowledge’ with respect to the inside informa-
tion. Despite the fact that case law under Rule 10b-5 is ambiguous, prescribing either the ‘know-
ing possession of’
80 or the ‘use of’
81 inside information, the regulator has to prove some type of 
‘knowledge’. The same applies to the European prohibition on insider trading, which is applica-
ble to the ‘use of’
82 inside information. 
  So, a legislator has at least two models to design the mens rea element in the prohibition on 
trade-based market manipulation. The first model connects liability to ‘recklessness in not know-
ing that one exercises unsupported price pressure’ and the second model to ‘knowing that one ex-
ercises unsupported price pressure’. The first model is preferable from a practical point of view. 
                                                        
78     See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (deciding that negligence is 
not actionable under Rule 10b-5). See further Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 
1033, 1045 (7th Cir. 1977) (deciding that a reckless omission of material facts are actionable un-
der Rule 10b-5). Criminal proceedings require willful violations of the Act, according to Section 
32(a) SEA 1934.
79     According to Section 1(2)(c) and 5 MAD 2003, it is prohibited to disseminate 
false or misleading information ‘where the person who made the dissemination knew, or ought to 
have known, that the information was false or misleading’. 
80     See, e.g., United States v. Teicher, 987 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1993) (arguing that the 
‘knowing possession of inside information’ is sufficient) 
81     See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 1998) (deciding that the 
‘use of inside information’ should be required in criminal cases) 
82     Section 2(1)(a) MAD 2003: ‘Member States shall prohibit any person (…) who 
possesses inside information from using that information by acquiring or disposing of (…) finan-
cial instruments (…).’ 
  54 Lowering the minimum mental state to ‘recklessness in not knowing’ makes the proof of manipu-
lation less complicated. Further, trade-based market manipulation relates more to information-
based manipulation, which uses the ‘recklessness in not knowing’-element, than to insider trad-
ing. Consequently, the trader would be allowed to underestimate the extent of his price pressure, 
overestimate his information position, and/ or miscalculate the justified price pressure, as long as 
he is not reckless in not knowing that he does so. I endorse the view that this approach results in a 
complex assessment. At the same time, it makes the adjudication adequate and transparent. 
 
V.  APPLICATION AND EXTENSION 
 
A.  Application 
  The application of the prohibition on manipulation has been troublesome since its introduc-
tion. Regulators find it hard to prove that suspects have manipulated the market. The ‘unsup-
ported price pressure’-standard will not bring relief and asks for an assessment of the justified 
price pressure. Yet, a regulator has two methods to prove the exercise of unsupported price pres-
sure: direct proof and alternative proof. 
 
1.  Direct proof of unsupported price pressure 
  The preferred way to prove unsupported price pressure is by arguing that the exercised price 
pressure was larger than the justified price pressure (formal proof) or to present incriminating re-
cords and statements (record proof). The formal method limits the probability of Type I errors, 
however, it is hard to discover the information position of the suspect at the moment of trading, 
  55 so that the approximation of the justified price pressure is questionable. Further, the regulator of 
course welcomes records and statements that incriminate the suspect, however, in most suspi-
cious situations there simply are none. I do not consider this as a weakness of the analysis. It 
shows why proof of unsupported price pressure is hard. The following paragraphs examine the 
idea and application of formal proof and record proof, notwithstanding that only a small percent-
age of the cases allows for these types of proof.  
  Section II and III explain how a regulator could uncover formal evidence of unsupported price 
pressure. I will shortly recapitulate the step-by-step process here. The regulator should first inves-
tigate the extent of the exercised price pressure by approximating (Section II.B.1) and polishing 
this value (Section II.B.2). He will then have to discover the information position of the suspect 
at the moment of trading. Thereupon, the information ought to be translated into the justified 
price pressure. If the regulator has determined both the exercised price pressure and justified 
price pressure, he has all the information to decide on the quality of the exercised price pressure. 
It is recommendable that a regulator, who decides that the suspect has exercised unsupported 
price pressure, investigates if either the unsupported price pressure is material or, in case the sus-
pect has benefited, the unsupported profit is material. 
  A regulator will now and then have recordings of suspicious conversations, which may be suf-
ficient to prove the exercise of unsupported price pressure. One can think of the following re-
cording: ‘I prefer a stock price of $12 instead of $10. Could you buy a large amount of shares and 
inflate the stock price? I will compensate you for all costs. The regulator will qualify this as ma-
nipulation, but I really need a high price at the moment.’ It would be a clear-cut case of unsup-
ported price pressure, if the conversation partner actually buys a large amount of shares and in-
flates the stock price. The regulator could argue that the suspect probably exercised unsupported 
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will be more troublesome when the recording is vague, leaving room for a scenario in which the 
suspect exercised supported price pressure. 
 
2.  Alternative proof of unsupported price pressure 
  In most situations, the regulator will probably not be able to provide formal proof of manipula-
tion, nor collect incriminating records. Alternatively, he will most likely focus on two specific 
situations. Firstly, imagine a trader exercising extreme price pressure, for example +$5, which he 
can hardly justify with an information set. Secondly, consider a trader who executes exceptional 
trades and price pressure right before he is in a position to make a profit that is dependent on the 
price pressure. Both situations provide indications that the trader has exercised unsupported price 
pressure. Further, there might be sufficient indications of the extent of the unsupported price 
pressure. The following part discusses these situations and how to deal with the proof of unsup-
ported price pressure and the materiality. 
  In principle, a trader does not want to exercise price pressure, let alone extreme price pressure, 
as he would trade at subordinate prices and make a loss. Nevertheless, there are examples of trad-
ers making mistakes when communicating orders to broker-dealers and examples of broker-
dealers making mistakes when entering the order, resulting in extreme price pressure. Consider a 
trader exercising price pressure of +$5, so that the stock price rises with 10%. Under these cir-
cumstances, a regulator is able to bear the evidence, since it is unlikely that the suspect can justify 
the price pressure with a sufficiently large information set. Of course, the suspect may provide 
proof to the contrary. In the absence of any rebuttal, the regulator is able to conclude that the ex-
  57 treme price pressure of +$5 is completely unsupported and that such unsupported price pressure 
is material. 
  Otherwise, the regulator might bear the evidence when the suspect cumulatively: (1) shows 
exceptional trading behavior, that is, his trading behavior deviates from his regular trading behav-
ior;
83 (2) exercises exceptional price pressure, that is, he exercises more price pressure than he 
normally exercises;
84 and (3) is able to make a profit, which is dependent on the exceptional price 
pressure.
85 Consider the situation in which the trader shows exceptional trading behavior, buying 
a large amount of shares ABC on the exchange and exercising upward price pressure of +$1, 
right before he sells an even larger amount of shares ABC in a contractual person-to-person deal 
at a price derived from the price on the exchange. When there is sufficient evidence that the price 
pressure of +$1 was completely unsupported, the question remains whether +$1 is considered to 
be material unsupported price pressure. If the regulator decides that such price unsupported price 
pressure is in fact immaterial, he could investigate whether the suspect realized a material unsup-
ported profit. This appraisal is contextual.
86
                                                        
 
83     The trading behavior may be qualified as exceptional when: (1) the number and 
the size of transactions deviates; (2) the interval between transactions is smaller; (3) the timing 
and the pattern of the transactions is different; (4) the type of instrument is conspicuous; and/ or 
(5) the trader uses market-orders instead of limit-orders. 
84     The price pressure is exceptional when a trader, who normally does not exercise 
any price pressure or minor price pressure, suddenly exercises large price pressure. This is suspi-
cious when the trader exercises this price pressure shortly before he can make a profit that is de-
pendent on this price pressure. 
85     The price pressure may go together with an expected profit, e.g., when the trader 
first exercises upward price pressure on the exchange and then sells a large amount of derivatives 
in another market on the exchange. Furthermore, exercising price pressure on the exchange in the 
shadow of contracts, offerings and takeovers might be profitable due to static prices off the ex-
change. 
86     It should be noted that the regulator, under the given circumstances, cannot auto-
matically conclude that a trader exercised unsupported price pressure. There is always a chance 
  58  
B.  Extension 
  Other prohibitions and parts of prohibitions might benefit from the ‘unsupported price pres-
sure’-standard as well. The prohibitions on manipulation in the United States, European Union, 
and Australia are not only applicable to traders who raise or depress the stock price but also to 
traders who create apparent active trading and induce other traders to follow suit. The prohibi-
tions are vague in this respect. Besides, the prohibition of corners and squeezes has proven to be 
problematic. The main question is how to distinguish between legitimate and manipulative cor-
ners and squeezes. We will examine if and how we might overcome these shortcomings with the 
proposed standard. 
 
1.  Unsupported market information 
As yet, the analysis has ignored the situation in which a trader executes transactions at t, 
not exercising any direct price pressure at t+1, but spreading market information at t+2, so that 
the market might create indirect price pressure at t+3. Normally, an informed trader values his in-
formation position highly and tries to protect it. As long as an informed trader can protect his in-
formation privilege, he will be able to make a profit by trading financial instruments. In order to 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
that the exercised price pressure was completely supported or immaterially unsupported. There-
fore, the regulator should look for additional circumstantial evidence that supports the hypothesis 
of unsupported price pressure. Besides, he should carefully analyze facts and circumstances, 
which throws doubt upon the hypothesis of unsupported price pressure. Also, the regulator can-
not conclude that the trader exercised unsupported price pressure if there is a large interval be-
tween the moment of exercising price pressure and the moment of benefiting from the price pres-
sure. A trader would probably not exercise unsupported price pressure if he cannot benefit from it 
right away. The trader would give corrective traders the chance to remove the market ineffi-
ciency, thereby losing his opportunity to making an unsupported profit. 
  59 protect his information from other market participants, he will act discreetly and limit the obtru-
siveness of his transactions. Nevertheless, he will have to act before the information becomes 
public by disclosure or research. As the informed trader starts trading more aggressively, he will 
spread more market information and break off his information privilege. Other market partici-
pants pick up this information and use it for their trading decisions.
87
In principle, an uninformed trader does not spread valuable market information and will be 
ignored by the rest of the market. Nonetheless, if an uninformed manipulator mimics the behavior 
of an informed trader, he can voluntarily spread false or misleading market information, which 
market participants believe to be true, possibly causing indirect unsupported price pressure. He 
could for example increase the number and/ or the size of his transactions, while trading at times 
when informed traders trade. By changing the characteristics of the trades, the uninformed trader 
falsely signals that he his informed. Market participants might believe these signals: Why else 
would he take a chance to attract traders and trade at subordinate prices? This way an uninformed 
trader might motive traders to jump on the bandwagon, causing indirect unsupported price pres-
sure. Such uninformed trader in fact spreads false or misleading information about the value of 
financial instruments. 
  Legislators sometimes qualify trading at t as manipulative when it creates no direct price pres-
sure at t+1, but produces false or misleading market information at t+2 (irrespective of the poten-
tial indirect price pressure at t+3). Three prohibitions in particular apply to this situation, them 
being Section 9(a) SEA 1934, Section 1(2)(a) MAD and Section 1041B CA. Section 9(a) SEA 
1934 formulates it as ‘creating actual or apparent active trading in’ a security ‘for purpose of in-
                                                        
87     Gilson and Kraakman have described this refined mechanism of derivatively in-
formed trading through trade decoding and price decoding. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 
28, at 572-579. 
  60 ducing the purchase or sale of such security by others’. Next, Section 1(2)(a) MAD 2003/6/EC 
applies to ‘transactions (…) which give, or are likely to give, false or misleading signals as to the 
supply of, demand for or price of financial instruments’. Likewise, Section 1041B CA prohibits 
for example an act that ‘is likely to have the effect of creating, or causing the creation of, a false 
or misleading appearance (…) of active trading’. 
  These prohibitions are not completely clear at face value and deserve an adequate interpreta-
tion. First, Section 9(a) 1934 vaguely defines the objective side. What do parts like ‘actual or ap-
parent active trading’ and ‘inducing the purchase or sale’ mean? It further relies heavily on the 
mens rea, by using the constituent element ‘for the purpose of inducing’. The European and Aus-
tralian definitions are objective, but again, without an explicit delineation. The European prohibi-
tion points at creating ‘false or misleading signals’, while the Australian prohibition describes it 
as ‘a false or misleading appearance (…) of active trading’. The problem with these two descrip-
tions is the lack of an explicit standard. When is the signal or the appearance false or misleading? 
The ‘unsupported price pressure’-standard cannot be used to interpret the prohibitions, since there 
is no direct price pressure, but only market information. 
  The solution is converting the ‘unsupported price pressure’-standard into an ‘unsupported 
market information’-standard, distinguishing between high- and low-quality market information. 
The trading results in supported market information if the trader possesses sufficient information. 
Otherwise, the trading results in unsupported market information. The prohibitions in effect can 
be replaced with or interpreted in line with the ‘unsupported market information’-standard. Sec-
tion 9(a) SEA 1934 could be interpreted as ‘executing transactions that result in unsupported 
market information for the purpose of inducing the purchase or sale of a security by others’, Sec-
tion 1(2)(a) MAD 2003/6/EC as ‘executing transactions that result in unsupported market infor-
  61 mation as to the supply of, demand for or price of financial instruments’, and Section 1041B CA 
as ‘an act that results in unsupported market information’. 
  Thus a trader manipulates the market when he trades and spreads unsupported market infor-
mation. A regulator will have to approximate the extent of the dispersed market information and 
the extent of the underlying information, before he can draw any conclusions about the quality of 
the market information. If the dispersed market information is larger than the underlying informa-
tion, the market information was false or misleading. It is not hard to imagine that a regulator will 
have problems applying the ‘unsupported market information’-standard in practice—they will 
rarely be able to furnish proof. This shortcoming, however, relates more to the complexity of 
regulating manipulation, than to quality of the ‘unsupported market information’-standard. There 
is, however, an exception. Fictitious transactions, like wash sales and matched orders, will spread 
false or misleading information by definition.  
 
2.  Corners and squeezes 
  A futures contract calls for delivery of a commodity, whereby the maturity date and agreed-
upon price are specified. A futures contract involves two contracting parties. The trader taking 
the long position commits to purchasing the commodity at the maturity date, while the trader tak-
ing the short position commits to delivering the commodity at this date. A futures contract is a 
zero-sum game: the long’s profit equals the spot price at maturity minus the agreed-upon price, 
while the short’s profit equals the agreed-upon price minus the spot price at maturity.
88 The long 
profits and the short loses when the spot price rises, just as the long loses and the short profits 
                                                        
88     See, e.g., ZVI BODIE, ALEX KANE, AND ALAN J. MARCUS, INVESTMENTS 740-741 
(2002). 
  62 when the spot price drops. Hedgers and speculators use futures markets for different reasons. 
Hedgers use futures contracts to reduce the risk of variable spot prices. By contrast, speculators 
use futures contracts to anticipate variable futures prices.
89
  Futures contracts provide opportunities for manipulation. A trader creates market power by 
buying a large part of the deliverable supply of the commodity (corner) and/ or taking a large 
long position (squeeze), thereby forcing the shorts to deliver the commodity at the expiration day. 
Since the shorts are only able to acquire the commodity at increasing marginal costs due to scar-
city in the delivery market (and due to transportation costs as regards to other markets), the spot 
price and futures price rise. The manipulator profits from his market power, because the shorts 
have to settle at an inflated price. The manipulator buys, for example, a large amount of wheat 
and a takes a large long position, thereby creating market power. Next, he limits the supply of the 
wheat and requires a large amount of deliveries, thereby inflating the spot price from $20 to $25. 
Shorts must either purchase commodities at an extra $5 or negotiate a cash settlement between $0 
and $5, which equals the profit of the manipulator. 
  Generally, the problem is how to distinguish between normal and manipulative market power. 
The analysis focuses on defining the distinction instead of tracing potential forms of manipulative 
market power. As the Introduction explains, after defining the concept of behavior, other points 
of controversy can be more readily discussed. Considering prior articles on corners and squeezes, 
authors regularly use two models to distinguish between normal and manipulative market power. 
The first model distinguishes between normal and artificial demand or normal and artificial 
                                                        
89     Id., at 750. 
  63 prices.
90 Normal demand results in a normal price and artificial demand in an artificial price. The 
second model discriminates between intent to create normal prices and intent to create artificial 
prices or between intent to trade legitimately and intent to corner or squeeze the market.
91 Basi-
cally, both models require a precise definition of normal and artificial demand or prices, which 
the literature has not yet provided.
92
  What are the conditions to qualify demand or prices as normal or artificial? According to the 
‘unsupported price pressure’-standard, the regulator should compare the exercised price pressure 
with the justified price pressure. A trader exercises supported price pressure and creates a normal 
futures price when the exercised price pressure is equal to or less than the justifiable price pres-
sure. Logically, the trader exercises unsupported price pressure and creates an artificial futures 
price when the exercised price pressure is larger than the justified price pressure. The method to 
determine the extent of the exercised price pressure is explained in Section II.B. and the method 
to derive the justifiable price pressure in Section III.A.2. The justifiable price pressure should be 
                                                        
90     Pirrong argues that ‘price artificiality is the sine qua non of manipulation’. Craig 
Pirrong, Commodity Market Manipulation Law: A (Very) Critical Analysis and a Proposed Al-
ternative, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 945, 960 (1994). Markham argues that a manipulator ‘is buy-
ing so many futures contracts and such large quantities of the underlying commodity that its mar-
ket power is sufficient to create and sustain a manipulated or artificial price.’; Jerry W. Markham, 
Manipulation of Commodity Futures Prices – The Unprosecutable Crime, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 
281, 283 (1991). 
91     Fischel and Ross conclude that definition is impossible without assessment of in-
tent. Fischel & Ross, supra note 3, at 547 (‘[W]e are left with no objective definition of manipu-
lation in futures markets.’); Friedman states that ‘[a]although intent is an essential element of a 
squeeze under the classical approach, it is intent to create an artificial price (…).’ Richard D. 
Friedman, Stalking the Squeeze: Understanding Commodities Market Manipulation, 89 MICH. L. 
REV. 31, 58 (1990). 
92     See, e.g. Fischel & Ross, supra note 3, at 546 (arguing that the concept of price ar-
tificiality brings no solution to distinguish between legitimate and manipulative market power); 
Friedman, supra note 88, at 54-55 (criticizing some interpretations of the term ‘artificial price’); 
Easterbrook, supra note 48, at 117-118 (arguing that real demand and artificial demand are indis-
tinguishable). 
  64 derived from the information position of the trader. The term ‘information’ includes all informa-
tion that: (1) points at an undervaluation or overvaluation of a futures contract; or (2) points at 
coming supported price pressure with respect to a futures contract. 
  Thus a trader manipulates the market when he exercises unsupported price pressure in the fu-
tures market (which accompanies an expected profit due to cornering the market and/ or squeez-
ing the shorts). It is important to note that a trader who buys a large part of the deliverable supply 
or takes a large long position, thereby exercising price pressure in the futures market and making 
a profit by cornering the market and/ or squeezing the shorts, is not automatically a manipulator. 
The trader might have sufficient information that he or other persons or companies will demand 
large amounts of the commodity, say wheat, in the near future, so that the exercised price pres-
sure is supported. This means that a regulator will always have to assess the information position 
and the potential demand of the suspect. It further means that an objective definition of futures 
manipulation is sufficient.
93 As Section IV.C.1. explains, legislators may include a mens rea ele-
ment, however, they are not obliged to do so. 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
  Trade-based market manipulation has received wide attention in theoretical and policy discus-
sions, even though the behavior is still poorly defined in both economic and legal literature. This 
Article contributes to an understanding of manipulation by providing a precise definition of the 
concept, that being exercising unsupported price pressure. The Article explains how legislators 
                                                        
93     Cf. Easterbrook, supra note 48, at 117-118 (‘No one accumulates futures contracts 
–for reasons good or ill– unaware of what he is doing. Everyone in the futures market intends to 
make as much money as he can. Scrutiny of intent therefore is not likely to assist in the search for 
manipulation.’). 
  65 could design an adequate prohibition on manipulation and how regulators might improve and in-
terpret contemporary prohibitions. It further provides insights in how to enforce a prohibition on 
manipulation. 
  A regulator should focus on the extent of price pressure rather than on the size of stock price 
changes. ‘Price pressure’ is defined as the contribution of a set of transactions to the total price 
change. Consequently, it is possible to distinguish between the contribution of the suspect and the 
contributions of other market participants to the stock price change. If a regulator would not look 
at the contribution of the suspect but at the stock price variance during the trading of the suspect, 
the regulator most likely overestimates or underestimates the contribution of the suspect to the 
stock price change. 
  Another recommendation is that a regulator ought to allow supported price pressure and ban 
unsupported price pressure. Supported price pressure has an adequate influence on the stock 
price, while unsupported price pressure creates a market inefficiency. If a trader’s price pressure 
is larger than the justifiable price pressure, he produces unsupported price pressure. The exercised 
price pressure minus the justified price pressure is the extent of the unsupported price pressure. 
Otherwise, if a trader’s price pressure is equal to or less than the justifiable price pressure, he 
produces supported price pressure. 
  An adequate prohibition on manipulation applies to all transactions that result in unsupported 
price pressure, causing extra price volatility and extra information asymmetries. A trader exercis-
ing unsupported price pressure initiates welfare shifts between uninformed traders on the one 
hand and corrective traders or himself on the other hand. Indeed, a trader who exercises unsup-
ported price pressure creates an informational privilege, of which he may take advantage. In con-
  66 clusion, we can say that unsupported price pressure results in welfare shifts and reduced liquidity, 
which has a negative impact on market operations. 
  The Article has some policy implications. It shows that legislators should design a prohibition 
on manipulation according to the ‘unsupported price pressure’-standard and interpret contempo-
rary prohibitions in line with this standard. Viewed in this context one can see why a regulator 
should take into account the materiality of the unsupported price pressure if possible. Further, 
contrary to conventional wisdom, the prohibition should better stress the objective side of ma-
nipulation than the mens rea. Finally, attention is paid to the way the regulator has to prove the 
exercise of unsupported price pressure. 
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